Cases, Controversies, and Diversity by Hessick, F. Andrew
Copyright  2015  by  F.  Andrew  Hessick Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  109,  No.  1 
57 
CASES, CONTROVERSIES, AND DIVERSITY 
F. Andrew Hessick 
ABSTRACT—Article III’s diversity jurisdiction provisions extend the 
federal judicial power to state law controversies between different states or 
nations and their respective citizens. When exercising diversity jurisdiction, 
the federal judiciary does not function in its usual role of protecting federal 
interests or ensuring the uniformity of federal law. Instead, federal courts 
operate as alternative state courts for resolving disputes between diverse 
parties. But federal courts often cannot act as alternative state courts 
because of Article III justiciability doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and 
mootness. These doctrines define when a federal court may act. But they do 
not apply to state courts. Rather, states have developed their own 
justiciability doctrines that substantially diverge from the federal ones. The 
consequence is that federal courts sitting in diversity cannot hear many 
claims that can be brought in state court and can hear other claims that state 
courts lack the power to decide. This Article argues that, instead of 
applying federal justiciability doctrines, federal courts should apply state 
justiciability doctrines to state law cases brought under diversity 
jurisdiction. Following state justiciability doctrines would better achieve 
the goals of allowing federal courts to function as alternative state courts. 
Moreover, following state justiciability doctrines in state law cases would 
not undermine the rationales underlying federal justiciability doctrines 
because those doctrines were developed to limit the federal judiciary’s 
ability to interfere with the other branches of the federal government—
concerns that are inapplicable in state law disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, tens of thousands of suits are filed in federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction.1 The primary reason for federal diversity 
jurisdiction is to provide an alternative forum for resolving state law claims 
free from the bias that state courts might harbor against out-of-state 
litigants.2 Thus, when exercising diversity jurisdiction, the federal judiciary 
 
1 See U.S. District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/
us-district-courts.aspx [http://perma.cc/87ZZ-5NUX] (noting that in 2012, 85,742 suits were filed based 
on diversity of citizenship). Diversity of citizenship is the most common basis for federal jurisdiction 
after “Federal Question” jurisdiction. Id. This number includes only suits between citizens of different 
states; it does not include suits presenting other forms of diversity, such as suits between a state and a 
citizen of another state. 
2 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (justifying diversity 
jurisdiction on the ground that “state attachments . . . might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be 
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 534 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (describing diversity jurisdiction as necessary 
because the “state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased” against out-of-state 
litigants). According to some, the fear of bias was limited not only to state judges, but also included 
state juries. See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 997 (2007). 
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does not function in its usual capacity as a coequal branch of the federal 
government. Instead, federal courts operate as an alternative forum to the 
state courts, resolving disputes between different states or nations and their 
respective citizens.3 In that role, as the Supreme Court has explained, the 
federal court is simply “another court of the State.”4 Its function is to 
interpret and enforce state law as any other court of that state would.5 
But federal courts sitting in diversity often cannot act as alternative 
forums to state courts because of federal justiciability doctrines.6 Deriving 
from the “case” or “controversy” language from Article III,7 these doctrines 
include standing, mootness, ripeness, the political question doctrine, and 
the prohibitions on hearing collusive suits and issuing advisory opinions.8 
They define the circumstances under which a federal court has the power 
under Article III to hear a dispute9—including a dispute brought under 
diversity jurisdiction.10 
Imposing federal justiciability requirements in diversity cases impairs 
the federal courts’ ability to serve as an alternative state forum. Article III 
does not apply to state courts, and state courts consequently need not 
follow federal justiciability doctrines.11 Instead, states have developed their 
own justiciability doctrines that substantially differ from the federal ones. 
The application of federal justiciability doctrines to suits in diversity thus 
causes a divergence between state courts and federal courts: Although 
federal courts sitting in diversity are supposed to function as state courts, 
they cannot hear some claims that a state court can hear, and they can hear 
other claims that a state court cannot. 
 
3 For purposes of this Article, the term “diversity jurisdiction” refers to the federal courts’ power 
under Article III to hear “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State; . . . between 
Citizens of different States; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
4 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945). 
5 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, 
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”). 
6 See infra note 132 (collecting examples). 
7 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of [justiciability] 
originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language . . . .”). 
8 See Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2007) (cataloguing 
doctrines).  
9 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) (“[A]ll concepts of justiciability . . . 
derive[] from . . . the ‘cases or controversies’ limitation imposed by Art. III.”). 
10 See, e.g., Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissing claim 
brought under diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing); see also Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 & n.6 (1994) (noting that federal courts apply federal justiciability 
doctrines to suits brought under diversity jurisdiction). 
11 See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often 
that . . . state courts are not bound by . . . federal rules of justiciability . . . .”). 
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Although scholars have written extensively on federal justiciability 
doctrines,12 none have examined whether these justiciability doctrines 
should apply to suits in diversity.13 This Article takes up that challenge. It 
argues that federal justiciability doctrines should not apply to state law 
disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction. Instead, federal courts sitting 
in diversity should apply state justiciability doctrines. 
Following state justiciability law would better achieve the primary 
goal of diversity jurisdiction: providing an alternative forum for resolving 
state law claims free from potential state court bias against out-of-state 
litigants. It would also increase parity between the state and federal 
courts.14 As the Court explained in the context of Erie v. Tompkins,15 for a 
federal court to serve as an alternative to state court in suits brought under 
diversity jurisdiction, parties must have the same substantive rights in the 
federal court as they do in state court.16 Following federal instead of state 
justiciability requirements in suits brought under diversity jurisdiction 
undermines that goal because it results in federal and state courts having 
different scopes of power to enforce rights. To be clear, my claim is not 
that Erie extends to justiciability. Erie is limited to questions of substantive 
law,17 and modern justiciability doctrines are not substantive law.18 But the 
 
12 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244–67 (2002) (discussing the 
evolution of political question doctrine); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 
221 (1988) (criticizing standing); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of 
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992) (criticizing mootness); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–71 (1973) (arguing for more expansive 
justiciability); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160 (1987) 
(criticizing ripeness); Siegel, supra note 8, at 122–38 (criticizing federal justiciability doctrines). 
13 Scholars have explored the converse question whether state courts should apply federal 
justiciability doctrines when hearing federal questions. See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 
265, 282–304 (1990) (arguing that state courts should be bound by federal justiciability doctrines when 
hearing issues of federal law); Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 
1291–96 (2011) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisdiction should extend to all state court determinations 
of federal law that are adverse to the claimed federal right). 
14 By parity, I mean the equal ability of federal and state courts to enforce state law. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1991) (defining parity between 
two courts as including an equal ability to enforce rights). 
15 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
16 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945) (“[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a 
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in 
effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made 
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the 
State.”). 
17 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, 
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”). 
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same concerns underlying Erie apply to questions of justiciability, and state 
justiciability doctrine therefore should inform the meaning of the term 
“controversies” in Article III for state law suits brought under diversity 
jurisdiction. In other words, although what constitutes a controversy is a 
question of constitutional law, federal courts should look to state law to 
give meaning to that constitutional term. 
Following state justiciability doctrines in state law suits brought under 
diversity jurisdiction would also not conflict with the rationales underlying 
federal justiciability doctrines. The two main reasons for federal 
justiciability doctrines are to protect the separation of powers and to ensure 
adverseness sufficient to frame the dispute for the court.19 But separation of 
powers concerns generally do not apply to state law cases brought under 
diversity jurisdiction because the powers of the other branches of the 
federal government are not implicated in those disputes.20 Nor do concerns 
about sufficient adverseness warrant following federal instead of state 
justiciability doctrines. State law should dictate the degree of adverseness 
necessary to warrant adjudication of state law claims. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by providing an 
overview of federal justiciability law and contrasting that law with state 
justiciability doctrines. It then explains how these differences have resulted 
in federal courts sitting in diversity refusing to hear claims that could be 
brought in state court. Part II makes the affirmative case for following state 
justiciability rules in state law diversity cases. It explains that following 
state justiciability doctrines is consistent with the text of the diversity 
provisions in Article III and better achieves the principal purpose 
motivating those provisions—to avoid state court bias against out-of-
staters—than the current practice of following federal doctrines. It also 
explains that, although Erie does not apply by its terms to justiciability, 
many of the same reasons supporting the requirement that federal courts 
apply state substantive law in diversity cases apply to justiciability as well. 
Part III explains why the justifications for federal justiciability doctrines do 
not apply to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. Part IV addresses 
various other concerns with applying state justiciability doctrines in 
 
18 For an argument that, if justiciability is substantive, federal courts should apply state 
justiciability doctrines when sitting in diversity, see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 417 (2013). 
19 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (explaining that justiciability serves the two 
roles of “limit[ing] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and . . . 
assur[ing] that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of 
government”). 
20 Of course, state lawsuits may implicate separation of powers if they are brought against 
particular parties, such as the United States. 
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diversity cases and explains why none of those concerns justify following 
federal justiciability doctrines in those cases. 
I. JUSTICIABILITY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
A. Federal Justiciability Doctrines 
Article III empowers the federal courts to exercise the “judicial 
[p]ower”21 to hear nine categories of cases and controversies.22 The 
Constitution does not define cases and controversies, and the Convention 
provides little insight into their meaning.23 Instead, the Court has provided 
meanings to those terms on a case-by-case basis through a common-law-
like process that focuses on the appropriate role of the judiciary in the 
federal system.24 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a variety of complex 
justiciability doctrines to determine when a dispute constitutes a case or 
controversy under Article III.25 These doctrines include the requirements 
that plaintiffs have standing,26 that their claims be ripe27 and not moot,28 that 
 
21 U.S. CONST. art. III § 1, cl. 1. 
22 The nine categories are: 
[(1)] Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . [(2)] Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; . . . [(3)] Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction; . . . [(4)] Controversies to which the United States will be a party; . . . [(5)] 
Controversies between two or more States;[ (6) controversies] between a State and Citizens of 
another State;[ (7) controversies] between Citizens of different States;[ (8) controversies] between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and [(9) controversies] 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
23 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND] (recounting James Madison’s statement that it was “generally supposed that the 
jurisdiction given” in Article III “was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature”). 
24 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (acknowledging that Article III “concepts have gained 
considerable definition from developing case law”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 
401 (1980) (“[J]usticiability doctrine[s] [are] of uncertain and shifting contours.” (quoting Flast, 392 
U.S. at 97)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–04 (1961) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court 
“evolved” the various justiciability doctrines); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in 
Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes 
Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1327 (2005) (stating that courts “fabricated” justiciability 
doctrines); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (acknowledging 
that defining the terms “cases” and “controversies” requires resort to “common understanding of what 
activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992))). 
25 See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 504 (explaining that the Court “evolved” the various justiciability 
doctrines); Siegel, supra note 8, at 76–77 (cataloguing the various justiciability doctrines). 
26 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (dismissing for lack of 
standing). 
27 E.g., Ullman, 367 U.S. at 508 (dismissing for lack of ripeness). 
28 E.g., Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 733 (2013) (dismissing for mootness). 
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plaintiffs are not requesting an advisory opinion29 or seeking the resolution 
of a political question,30 and that their suits are not collusive or otherwise 
nonadversarial.31 Although grounded in Article III, these doctrines are only 
loosely connected to that provision; indeed, many of these doctrines began 
as rules of judicial self-restraint and were tied to Article III only in the 
twentieth century.32 The only apparent exceptions are the prohibition on 
advisory opinions and the political question doctrine. Early refusals to issue 
advisory opinions invoked Article III,33 and early references to the political 
question doctrine grounded it in the role of the judiciary under Article III.34 
The theory underlying most of the federal justiciability doctrines is 
that the function of federal courts is to provide remedies for violations of 
rights.35 Under this “dispute resolution” model,36 the role of the federal 
courts is not to expound on constitutional or other legal questions or to 
police the other branches of government.37 Courts may engage in these 
functions, but only in the course of resolving a dispute arising from the 
violation of rights.38 
Standing provides an example of this view of dispute resolution. For a 
plaintiff to have standing, he must demonstrate that he has suffered, or 
imminently will suffer, a concrete and personal injury to a legal interest; 
that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; 
and that a court can redress the injury through a favorable decision.39 Under 
these requirements, an individual has standing to seek a remedy only for 
harm to herself; she cannot sue to complain about illegal action that did not 
 
29 E.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has [no] power to render 
advisory opinions . . . .”). 
30 E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (dismissing for political question). 
31 E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1911) (dismissing suit for lack of 
adversity). 
32 Hall, supra note 13, at 1267 (“[C]ourts dismissed [non-justiciable] cases using language 
suggesting an exercise of discretion.”). 
33 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (suggesting that Article III prohibited a scheme 
under which the Secretary of War reviewed judicial determinations of veterans benefits). 
34 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that, because the 
Constitution commits them to another branch, political questions “can never be made in this court”). 
35 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts 
[the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts [of] redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual 
or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by . . . violation of law.”).  
36 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 72 (6th ed. 2009). 
37  Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1365; Siegel, supra note 8, at 77. 
38 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 492 (“Except when necessary in the execution of that function, courts 
have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action.”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts 
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (“Federal courts . . . pass on constitutional 
questions because . . . they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction . . . .”). 
39 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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cause her harm.40 According to the Supreme Court, these requirements 
ensure that the judiciary stays within its “province of . . . decid[ing] on the 
rights of individuals.”41 
The other theory underlying federal justiciability is the “special 
functions” model.42 This model rejects the notion that the role of federal 
courts is solely to remedy violations of rights; instead, it posits that the 
judicial function also includes articulating constitutional values and 
ensuring government compliance with the law.43 Thus, unlike the dispute 
resolution model, the special functions model would extend standing to 
citizens concerned about illegal government action.44 The model does not 
claim that the courts may perform these law-articulating and enforcement 
functions at any time; federal courts still may act only to resolve a case or 
controversy by entering a judgment binding parties to the suit.45 But what 
constitutes a case or controversy—the occasions for entering those 
judgments—is broader.46 
Although the dispute resolution model underlies most federal 
justiciability doctrines, several doctrines rest on the special functions 
model.47 One example is the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception to mootness.48 That exception allows a court to hear a claim that 
is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will 
again engage in the complained-of conduct.49 The exception does not exist 
to vindicate private rights; plaintiffs in such cases receive no relief for the 
violation of their rights. Instead, the purpose of the exception is to clarify 
the law and deter future violations.50 
Despite their differences, both the dispute resolution model and special 
functions model agree that justiciability involves the question of the federal 
court’s appropriate role with respect to the other branches of government. 
Both balance considerations of when the federal courts should intervene to 
enforce federal law against the need to avoid unduly interfering with the 
elected branches. Consequently, it is unsurprising that federal justiciability 
 
40 Id. at 571–78. 
41 Id. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
42 Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1368–71. This model is also known as the “law declaration” model. 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 36, at 73. 
43 Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1368–71. 
44 Id. 
45 See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 284 (1990) (explaining that the 
special functions model expands the scope of “the parties and issues” subject to adjudication). 
46 Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1397. 
47 Id. at 1368. 
48 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998). 
49 See id.  
50 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 
327 (2008). 
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doctrines have developed almost exclusively in the context of determining 
whether to adjudicate disputes “arising under” federal law or the 
Constitution.51 
B. Variance Between State and Federal Justiciability 
Article III’s limitations apply only to the federal courts; they do not 
extend to state courts.52 States have developed their own justiciability rules 
defining the authority of their judiciaries. These doctrines vary from state 
to state.53 Some states have adopted doctrines that roughly resemble the 
federal justiciability doctrines. Other states allow greater access to their 
courts than is available under the federal doctrines. Those latter states have 
more readily embraced a special functions model of adjudication, 
establishing a broader role for the courts in their governmental system. This 
section discusses differences between state justiciability doctrines and 
federal justiciability doctrines. 
1. Standing.—Standing defines who may bring suit in federal court, 
and is “perhaps the most important” of the federal justiciability doctrines.54 
The basic requirements for Article III standing are that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he has suffered a “particularized” “injury in fact” to a 
“judicially cognizable interest,” that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the 
actions of the defendant, and that the injury will “likely . . . be redressed by 
a favorable decision.”55 This test rests on a private-rights conception of the 
federal courts. It limits access to the federal courts to only those litigants 
 
51 See Pushaw, supra note 10 (explaining that the cases developing justiciability doctrines are 
“invariably . . . federal question case[s]”). These doctrines have not developed in the course of resolving 
cases based solely on diversity jurisdiction under Article III because the Supreme Court does not 
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to clarify issues of state law. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court does not review 
“question[s] of state law”). 
52 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not 
apply to state courts . . . .”). 
53 The source of these doctrines also varies from state to state. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts 
and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–46 (2001) 
(noting that state doctrines derive from state constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions). 
54 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
55 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560–61 (1992)). Courts also require the injury to be “actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
As the Court has acknowledged, the imminence requirement mirrors the hardship inquiry for ripeness. 
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 & n.8 (2007). For simplicity, this Article 
discusses the requirement in terms of ripeness. 
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that seek a remedy for personal injuries.56 An individual cannot go to 
federal court simply to ensure compliance with the law.57 
Further, the Supreme Court has limited the types of injuries that 
qualify for standing. For instance, aside from a limited class of suits based 
on the Establishment Clause,58 a taxpayer cannot base standing on federal 
or state governmental misuse of tax money.59 Similarly, a generalized 
interest an individual shares with other members of the public is not 
sufficient to establish Article III standing.60 According to the Court, to 
allow these common injuries to suffice for standing would unduly expand 
the power of the judiciary at the expense of the elected branches of 
government.61 Instead, to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he has suffered a distinct harm beyond the violation of his 
interest in seeing the law obeyed. Moreover, the Court has held that 
Congress cannot avoid this Article III limitation on standing by enacting 
citizen-suit statutes authorizing private individuals to enforce the law.62 
Standing doctrine varies widely among the states. Some states, like 
Rhode Island, Wyoming, Indiana, and Arizona, have adopted an injury in 
fact test similar to the federal one.63 Others, such as California, Louisiana, 
and New Hampshire, have rejected that test, concluding that standing 
 
56 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2000) 
(“[T]he Art. III judicial power exists only to redress . . . injury to the complaining party.” (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))). 
57 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77.  
58 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968). 
59 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445 (2011). 
60 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (prohibiting standing based on “generalized interest” (quoting 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990))). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 576–77 (rejecting the argument that “the public interest in proper administration of the 
laws . . . can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such”). In earlier 
cases, the Court said that standing may exist “solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Lujan distinguished these cases by saying that Congress cannot confer standing on a 
person who has not suffered a “de facto” injury; instead, Congress may simply identify which factual 
injuries may form the basis of standing. 504 U.S. at 577–78.  
63 E.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987) (basing standing on “interest-
injury,” such as “economic” harm); Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 
2005) (en banc) (stating that a plaintiff must allege “palpable injury” for standing (quoting Sears v. 
Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1998))); State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 
978, 979 (Ind. 2003) (stating standing turns on a showing of “injury”); Ritchhart v. Daub, 594 N.W.2d 
288, 291–92 (Neb. 1999) (requiring a “personal stake” to show standing); Haviland v. Simmons, 45 
A.3d 1246, 1256 (R.I. 2012) (stating that only a “plaintiff who has suffered injury in fact” has standing 
(quoting Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 151 (R.I. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))); 
To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 27 P.3d 1149, 1154–55 (Wash. 2001) (requiring “sufficient factual 
injury” for standing (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 82 (Wash. 1978))); Miller v. 
Wyo. Dep’t of Health, 275 P.3d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 2012) (expressly following federal standard).  
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depends on whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a legal right.64 
Others have concluded that injury in fact is the default requirement for 
standing but that the legislature may extend standing by statute to plaintiffs 
who have not experienced a factual injury.65 And some have adopted still 
other tests. In Utah, for example, plaintiffs may have standing when there is 
no other person better situated to bring suit.66 Moreover, various states have 
said that standing is a prudential doctrine subject to legislative 
modification.67 And some have concluded that standing is not jurisdictional 
at all,68 and consequently may be waived and, presumably, modified by the 
legislature.69 
States have also not placed the same restrictions on generalized 
grievances as the Supreme Court. For example, according to a recent 
survey, at least thirty-six states allow taxpayer standing.70 Furthermore, 
many states, including six that otherwise require injury in fact (Arizona, 
 
64 See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (looking solely to 
rights conferred by statute to determine standing); La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 
So. 2d 1185, 1192 (La. 1996) (determining standing by looking only to alleged violation of rights); 
Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Sec’y of State, 965 A.2d 1078, 1080 (N.H. 2008) (“In evaluating whether a 
party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the party suffered a legal injury against which the law 
was designed to protect.” (quoting Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 766 A.2d 678 (N.H. 
2000))).  
65 See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010) 
(stating that “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action” or “if the litigant has a 
special injury”); In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2011) (“Standing to appeal may 
be conferred by a statute or by the appellant’s status as an aggrieved party.”); Harrison County. v. City 
of Gulfport, 557 So. 2d 780, 782 (Miss. 1990) (granting standing based on “adverse effect” or as 
“otherwise authorized by law”); Youngblood v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 
2013) (requiring injury in fact only “[w]hen no statute confers standing”); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000) (requiring injury “absent a statutory exception” (quoting Hunt v. 
Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984))); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (basing 
standing on “statutory right” or “direct injury”).  
66 See, e.g., Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013). 
67 See, e.g., Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (“Standing [is] a 
matter of self-restraint . . . .”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 312 (Haw. 2007) 
(describing “standing doctrine” as “prudential rules of judicial self-governance”); Lansing Sch. Educ. 
Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699 (calling standing “prudential”); Kellas v. Dep’t of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 143 
(Or. 2006) (describing standing as “prudent” (citation omitted)); In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 
(Pa. 2003) (calling “standing” a “prudential, judicially-created tool”). 
68 See, e.g., Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Miller Cnty. Cir. Ct., 361 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ark. 2010) 
(“[S]tanding is not a component of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 
930 N.E.2d 895, 916 (Ill. 2010) (“[L]ack of standing is an affirmative defense . . . .”); Harrison v. 
Leach, 323 S.W.3d 702, 707–08 (Ky. 2010) (“[A] trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct 
from standing . . . .”).  
69 See, e.g., Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 916 (stating that a lack of standing defense can be forfeited). 
70 Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional 
Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1277 
(2012).  
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Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming), waive 
standing requirements in cases raising an important public interest.71 
2. Ripeness.—Unlike standing, which limits who can bring suit, 
ripeness defines when a person may bring suit.72 Ripeness prohibits courts 
from hearing suits prematurely.73 It limits jurisdiction only when a plaintiff 
seeks prospective relief like an injunction to prevent future harms.74 
Ripeness in federal courts depends on two considerations: (1) whether the 
parties will suffer hardship without prompt judicial consideration and (2) 
whether the issues are fit for immediate judicial review or would benefit 
from future developments.75 According to the Supreme Court, ripeness 
involves “constitutional” and “prudential” considerations,76 but the Court 
has not clarified whether constitutional considerations underlie only one or 
both prongs of the ripeness inquiry.77 
Many states follow the federal standard.78 But some do not. A few 
states, such as Arkansas, have focused only on the fitness prong,79 whereas 
 
71 Youngblood, 741 S.E.2d at 518 (recognizing “public importance exception”); Gregory, 299 P.3d 
at 1104 (waiving standing in suit claiming violation of the Utah constitution’s single-subject rule on the 
ground that the suit was of “significant public importance” (quoting Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. 
Tooele County. ex rel. Tooele Cnty. Comm’n, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (Utah 2009))); Vill. Rd. Coal. v. Teton 
Cnty. Hous. Auth., 298 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2013) (relaxing standing in cases of “great public interest” 
(quoting Maxfield v. State, 294 P.3d 895, 900 (Wyo. 2013))); see Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 
108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (same); State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 
N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind. 2003) (same); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) (same); Bd. of 
Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning v. Ray, 809 So. 2d 627, 632 (Miss. 2002) (same); New Energy 
Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 290 (N.M. 2011) (same); see also Sierra Club, 167 P.3d at 312 
(relaxing standing when “the needs of justice so require”); Nebraskans Against Expanded Gambling, 
Inc. v. Neb. Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n, 605 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Neb. 2000) (noting 
“great public concern” exception); Salorio v. Glaser, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (N.J. 1980); State ex rel. 
Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45, 52 (Okla. 1980); Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 
(R.I. 1992) (recognizing “substantial public interest” exception); To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 27 
P.3d 1149, 1155 (Wash. 2001) (waiving standing when “the interest of the public . . . is overwhelming” 
(quoting In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 660 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), amended by 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 
1987))).  
72 Nichol, supra note 12, at 160–62. 
73 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). 
74 F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (2012). 
75 Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.  
76 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010). 
77 As a logical matter, only the hardship inquiry should be based on Article III. Whether a case is fit 
for review does not implicate the power of the courts to act; instead, it focuses on whether the court has 
adequate information to make an informed decision. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
§ 2.4.1, at 119 (6th ed. 2012) (“[T]he focus on the quality of the record seems prudential.”). 
78 See, e.g., La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 94 So. 3d 760, 763 (La. 2012) (asking whether “issues 
are fit” for review and whether “the parties will suffer hardship” if the court does not grant the 
requested relief); accord Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 219 P.3d 
1111, 1123 (Haw. 2009); Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 901 N.E.2d 373, 384 (Ill. 2008); State ex rel. 
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others, like Oregon and Florida, have focused only on the hardship prong.80 
Some states have explicitly rejected the federal standard. Alaska, for 
example, has stated that its ripeness doctrines are “more lenient than their 
federal counterpart.”81 Other states have said that their ripeness doctrine 
differs from the federal one but have looked to federal decisions for 
guidance.82 And some states have not yet developed a robust ripeness 
doctrine.83 
States also differ on whether ripeness is mandatory or discretionary. 
Most states have concluded that ripeness is prudential,84 but at least six 
have deemed it mandatory.85 And some states have concluded that parts of 
ripeness are mandatory and others are discretionary. For example, 
Kentucky has deemed the hardship prong mandatory but the fitness prong 
discretionary,86 while Nebraska has deemed the fitness prong mandatory 
but the hardship prong prudential.87 
 
Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 377–83 (Kan. 2008); Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 
707, 713 (R.I. 2000).  
79 Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Ark. 1996) (basing ripeness on whether “additional 
facts are necessary for decision”). 
80 State v. Newman, 405 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. 1981) (discussing only the plaintiff’s stake to 
determine ripeness); Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Or. 2004) (stating that ripeness involves the 
“practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties” (quoting Brumnett v. Psychiatric Sec. 
Review Bd., 848 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Or. 1993))). 
81 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 942 (Alaska 2004). 
82 See, e.g., State v. Fischer, 876 A.2d 232, 237 (N.H. 2005) (stating that the state has “not adopted 
a formal test for ripeness,” but finding federal test “persuasive”); Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249 
(Tex. 2001) (stating that “ripeness . . . should be determined by state law” but following federal test); 
State v. M.W., 57 A.3d 696, 699 (Vt. 2012) (declaring federal ripeness law “instructive” but not 
binding); see also Ex parte Riley, 11 So. 3d 801, 806–07 (Ala. 2008) (following the same “basic 
rationale” as federal ripeness doctrine). 
83 Winkle v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that a court cannot render 
judgment “on a situation that may never occur” (citing Ariz. Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 682 P.2d 
443, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984))); Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 
331, 336 (Ind. 1994) (ripeness depends on whether the dispute turns on “actual facts rather than on 
abstract possibilities”); Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739–40 (Ky. 2007) (stating that questions 
that “are purely advisory or hypothetical” are not ripe (quoting Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 
S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005))); Granville Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. N.C. Hazardous Waste 
Mgmt. Comm’n, 407 S.E.2d 785, 791 (N.C. 1991) (stating ripeness prevents “premature intervention” 
(quoting Elmore v. Lanier, 155 S.E.2d 114, 116 (N.C. 1967))). 
84 See Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida Private 
Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 419 n.40 (1995) (“[S]tate courts apply 
ripeness . . . under prudential concerns.”). 
85 See Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo. 2008); Davidson v. Wright, 151 
P.3d 812, 817 (Idaho 2006); State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 382 (Kan. 2008); Am. 
Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So. 2d 158, 162 (La. 1993); MEA-
MFT v. McCulloch, 291 P.3d 1075, 1078 (Mont. 2012); State v. Hammer, 787 N.W.2d 716, 725 (N.D. 
2010). 
86 W.B. v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.3d 108, 114–17 (Ky. 2012). 
87 Omaha v. Elkhorn, 752 N.W.2d 137, 145 (Neb. 2008). 
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In addition, ripeness does not function the same way in state and 
federal court. For example, states with liberal standing rules allow litigants 
to avoid ripeness obstacles.88 Ripeness limits jurisdiction only when a 
plaintiff alleges a possible future injury; it does not apply when a plaintiff 
seeks relief for a present harm. States with broad standing doctrines have 
expanded the scope of what constitutes a present injury. For instance, a 
concerned citizen invoking a citizen suit provision may base standing on 
either the present harm of the defendant’s illegal conduct or the possible 
future injury that the plaintiff may suffer from the defendant’s illegal 
conduct. The latter type of injury raises ripeness concerns because the 
injury may not transpire. But the former type of injury is a presently 
occurring injury that raises no ripeness issues. Thus, ripeness poses less of 
an obstacle in states that recognize standing under citizen suit provisions. 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion in Lansing Schools Education 
Association v. Lansing Board of Education provides an example.89 There, 
schoolteachers sought an injunction ordering the school board to expel 
students who assaulted teachers.90 Under federal law, the only interest that 
would have sufficed for the teachers’ standing was the threat that they 
might face assaults, but that claim of injury would not have been justiciable 
under federal ripeness doctrine because the teachers did not claim that they 
faced an imminent threat of assault.91 The Michigan Supreme Court, 
however, concluded that the claim was justiciable because the teachers had 
standing based on their present interest in seeing the appropriate 
enforcement of the law92—an interest that does not support standing under 
federal doctrine.93 
3. Mootness.—Mootness is the counterpart to ripeness. It bars a 
federal court from hearing a claim if the plaintiff loses his interest in the 
case after it has been filed.94 In that circumstance, the Supreme Court has 
explained, the court hearing the suit no longer has a case or controversy 
before it.95 
 
88 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 942 (Alaska 2004) (noting that 
liberal standing rules expand ripeness because “[r]ipeness is an aspect of standing”). 
89 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010). 
90 Id. at 689. 
91 Although the teachers claimed to have been assaulted in the past, past injuries do not support 
standing to seek prospective relief under federal doctrine. See id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–11 (1995) (“[P]ast injury . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate 
threat . . . [of] similar injury in the future.” (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
92 Lansing Schs., 792 N.W.2d at 701; see also Cusack v. Howlett, 254 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ill. 1969) 
(rejecting a ripeness challenge on the ground that plaintiff had present taxpayer standing). 
93 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992). 
94 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). 
95 Id. 
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Unlike with the other Article III justiciability doctrines, federal courts 
have largely applied a special functions model to mootness, recognizing a 
number of exceptions to mootness that allow courts to resolve cases even in 
the absence of a continuing dispute. For example, federal courts may hear 
an otherwise moot case when the issue presented is “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review”;96 when the defendant ceased its conduct voluntarily;97 
when the lead plaintiff in an uncertified class action has had his claim 
resolved;98 or when the challenged action has collateral consequences for 
the plaintiff.99 
States also prohibit the resolution of moot cases.100 Although many 
have recognized exceptions similar to those for federal mootness,101 the 
overlap is not complete. Oregon, for example, does not recognize the 
capable of repetition yet evading review exception,102 and many states have 
not had the opportunity to determine whether to recognize the class action 
exception.103 Moreover, even in those states that do recognize the federal 
exceptions, the scope of those exceptions differs from state to state.104 
Furthermore, states have created other exceptions that the federal courts do 
not recognize. The most common is an exception for cases presenting 
 
96 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1992) (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 
(1969)). That exception allows a court to hear a claim that is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable 
probability that the defendant will again engage in the complained-of conduct. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 
(citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 474, 481 (1990)). 
97 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). 
98 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980). 
99 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53 (1968). 
100 See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
562, 567 n.14 (2009) (noting that states have adopted mootness restrictions). 
101 For states that apply the capable of repetition yet evading review exception, see State v. Rochon, 
75 So. 3d 876, 886 n.12 (La. 2011) (gathering state cases). For states applying the voluntary cessation 
exception, see, for example, Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 72 (Ala. 
2009); Wolf v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 327 N.E.2d 885, 889–90 (Mass. 1975); Oklahoma 
Firefighters Pension & Retirement System v. City of Spencer, 237 P.3d 125, 129 (Okla. 2009); Allen v. 
Colautti, 417 A.2d 1303, 1306 (Pa. 1980); and All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste District, 670 
A.2d 800, 803 (Vt. 1995). For states applying the class action exception, see Kagan v. Gibraltar 
Savings & Loan Ass’n, 676 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Cal. 1984); Wolf, 327 N.E.2d at 890; and Heckman v. 
Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 163 (Tex. 2012). For states applying the collateral consequences 
doctrine, see Zachary C. Howenstine, Conforming Doctrine to Practice: Making Room for Collateral 
Consequences in the Missouri Mootness Analysis, 73 MO. L. REV. 859, 869 nn.67–69 (2008) (gathering 
cases).  
102 Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Or. 2004) (“The judicial power under the Oregon 
Constitution does not extend to moot cases that are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”). 
103 Searches on Westlaw reveal fewer than thirty state cases even discussing such an exception. 
WESTLAWNEXT, http://next.westlaw.com [http://perma.cc/N5DS-QX49] (search “moot! /20 class /3 
action /10 except!”). 
104 See, e.g., Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819 (R.I. 2007) (limiting capable of repetition yet 
evading review exception to cases involving public importance); Howenstine, supra note 101, at 870–
72 (noting a more narrow collateral order exception in Connecticut and Missouri). 
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questions of public importance.105 Others include the power to hear a moot 
case if the issue occurs frequently106 and an exception if the issue becomes 
moot only after argument.107 Finally, many states have deemed mootness 
prudential,108 and consequently modifiable by the legislature and waivable. 
4. Nonadversarial Suits.—Federal courts cannot hear suits in which 
the parties are not adverse. For example, in Moore v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that there was 
“no case or controversy” when both the plaintiff and the defendant sought 
the same outcome in the case.109 
Most state courts that have addressed the issue also forbid 
nonadversarial suits110 although a few courts maintain that their jurisdiction 
includes nonadversarial suits. For example, courts in Louisiana have held 
 
105 See, e.g., Underwood v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 130 (Ala. 2009) (“There is a 
well established exception to the mootness doctrine allowing courts to reach the ultimate issue even if it 
has become moot where a broad public interest is involved.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 843 (Haw. 2008) (recognizing “the public interest 
exception”); Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438, 448 (Wyo. 2012) (“If a case 
presents an issue of great public importance or interest, we may rule on the issue even if the dispute is 
technically moot.”); accord Gray v. Mitchell, 285 S.W.3d 222, 233 (Ark. 2008); State v. Rogers, 91 
P.3d 1127, 1130–31 (Idaho 2004); In re Commitment of Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 2006). 
106 Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d at 500.  
107 In re Dunn, 181 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
108 Hall, supra note 100, at 567 n.14 (“State courts . . . generally treat their mootness doctrines as 
prudential . . . .”). For states treating mootness as a mandatory doctrine, see Chapman v. Gooden, 974 
So. 2d 972, 983–84 (Ala. 2007); State v. T.D., 944 A.2d 288, 294 (Conn. 2008); National Education 
Ass’n-Topeka, Inc. v. U.S.D. 501, 608 P.2d 920, 923 (Kan. 1980); Kentucky High School Athletics Ass’n 
v. Runyon, 920 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. 1996); St. Charles Parish School Board v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 
1165, 1166 (La. 1987); In re B.S. v. State, 966 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Progressive 
Direct Insurance Co. v. Stuivenga, 276 P.3d 867, 872 (Mont. 2012); Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 
876, 877 (N.Y. 1980); National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. 1999); and 
State v. Rooney, 965 A.2d 481, 484 (Vt. 2008). 
109 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (per curiam); see also, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 360–61 
(1911) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a suit in which the United States had “no interest adverse to the 
claimants”). Although usually framed in terms of Article III, at least some modern authority describes 
the limitation as prudential. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 171 
n.3 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the “policy against friendly or collusive suits” and 
distinguishing that policy from “justiciability” doctrines). 
110 See City of Birmingham v. Bouldin, 190 So. 2d 271, 274 (Ala. 1966); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. 
Boyd, 140 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1943); Commonwealth United Corp. v. Rothberg, 143 S.E.2d 741, 742 
(Ga. 1965); Cnty. of Kaua’i v. Baptiste, 165 P.3d 916, 931 (Haw. 2007); Schneider v. Howe, 133 P.3d 
1232, 1237 (Idaho 2006); Neu v. Neu, 298 N.W. 318, 320 (Mich. 1941); Clinton Co-op. Farmers 
Elevator Ass’n v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 26 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. 1947); Meeker v. 
Straat, 38 Mo. App. 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1889); Haley v. Eureka Cnty. Bank, 26 P. 64, 66–67 (Nev. 
1891). 
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that they may hear nonadversarial suits,111 and Maryland courts have held 
that they may hear such suits so long as they present important issues.112 
5. Political Questions.—Unlike the other doctrines of justiciability, 
which ask only whether a dispute has taken the appropriate form for 
judicial resolution, the political question doctrine limits the power of the 
courts to decide issues in particular subject areas. Although ill-defined,113 
the doctrine applies to essentially two situations.114 First, it prohibits courts 
from resolving disputes that the Constitution commits to another branch of 
the federal government.115 This limitation does not derive from Article III. 
Instead, it flows from other provisions of the Constitution that assign 
particular subjects to other branches,116 and it applies equally to federal and 
state courts. No court—state or federal—can decide an issue that the 
Constitution commits to another institution.117 
Second, a dispute presents a political question when there is “a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”118 
Although a doctrine of justiciability, this limitation depends on the content 
of substantive law: a dispute presents a political question if a court cannot 
identify a manageable standard to implement substantive law.119 Almost all 
 
111 Blaize v. Hayes, 15 So. 2d 217, 224 (La. 1943) (“[A] lawsuit is not objectionable to the courts 
merely because the parties to the suit believe that it should and desire that it shall be decided in a given 
way.”). 
112 Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n, Inc. v. Olander, 410 A.2d 592, 596 (Md. 1980) (stating that 
suits that involve “the validity of a statute or . . . regulation . . . , or an urgently needed determination 
affecting future governmental conduct, and in which the public’s concern is both imperative and 
manifest, need not hereafter necessarily be dismissed as collusive.” (quoting Reyes v. Prince George’s 
Cnty., 380 A.2d 12, 24 (Md. 1977))).  
113 Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 
(1985) (noting disagreement over scope and importance of doctrine). 
114 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), lists six considerations for finding a political question: 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
[(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.  
But the Court has indicated that only the first two considerations are important. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (stating that the other tests are of less importance). 
115 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).  
116 See Pushaw, supra note 24, at 1294 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).  
117 See Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 317 (Wash. 2009) (recognizing that state courts cannot 
resolve issues “conferred upon Congress”). 
118 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
119 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (dismissing political gerrymandering claim as nonjusticiable because 
of lack of judicially manageable standard); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards 
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1285–96 (2006) (identifying criteria to assess 
manageability of substantive law). 
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states that have addressed the issue have adopted this standard.120 The one 
exception is Wyoming, which has stated that it is not bound by the 
judicially manageable standard, though it has not provided a different 
standard for determining political questions.121 
6. Advisory Opinions.—Federal courts cannot issue advisory 
opinions. Although courts have used the term “advisory opinion” 
broadly—essentially as a catchall to refer to cases that are not justiciable 
because of defects in standing, ripeness, mootness, or adversity—the 
doctrine in its pure form prohibits a federal court from providing advice on 
legal questions posed by Congress or the President.122 A corollary of that 
prohibition is that courts cannot issue a decision that is subject to review by 
another branch of government;123 such a decision merely provides advice to 
the reviewing entity, which may decide the matter differently from the 
courts. 
States agree that requests for advisory opinions are not justiciable.124 
Although eleven states authorize their supreme courts to issue advisory 
opinions to their legislatures or governors,125 all but one have stated that 
advisory opinions are not the product of the exercise of the judicial 
power.126 In these states, when courts render advisory opinions, they are not 
 
120 See, e.g., State v. Tongass Conservation Soc’y, 931 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1997); Kromko v. 
Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 171 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 378 
(Colo. 2009) (en banc); Nielsen v. State, 670 A.2d 1288, 1291–92 (Conn. 1996); Trs. of Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 446, 458 (Haw. 1987); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 
N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 
178–79 (Neb. 2007); In re Veto by Governor Chris Christie, 58 A.3d 735, 744 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2012); Bay Ridge Cmty. Council v. Carey, 454 N.Y.S.2d 186, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Thornburgh v. 
Lewis, 470 A.2d 952, 955 (Pa. 1983); Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm., 214 S.W.3d 419, 
435 (Tenn. 2007). 
121 State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 334–35 (Wyo. 2001). 
122 Lee, supra note 12, at 643–47. 
123 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792). 
124 Jonathan D. Persky, Comment, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State Advisory 
Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1180–81 (2005) (cataloging states). 
125 Eight states do so by constitution, see COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 3(b)(10); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. III, § 8; N.H. 
CONST. pt. II, art. LXXIV; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5, and three by statute, see 
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1003 
(West 2003). The scope of the power varies from state to state. Rhode Island, for example, permits 
advisory opinions on “any question of law” at the request of the governor or legislature. R.I. CONST. art. 
X, § 3. By contrast, Alabama limits the power to addressing only “important constitutional questions,” 
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10, and Oklahoma permits advisory opinions only on whether a death sentence was 
properly imposed, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1003. 
126 See Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 101, 107 n.28 (collecting authority from each state that issues 
advisory opinions, except Colorado, stating that those opinions are not the product of the judicial 
power). 
109:57 (2015) Cases, Controversies, and Diversity 
75 
adjudicating; rather, they are exercising a separate power, much as they do 
when they promulgate rules of civil procedure.127 The one possible 
exception is Colorado. Its supreme court has said that its advisory opinions 
have the “force and effect of judicial precedents.”128 Still, that those 
opinions are binding does not mean that they must be the product of the 
judicial power (after all, rules of civil procedure are binding yet not the 
product of the judicial power), and the Colorado court has not addressed 
the issue. 
C. Justiciability in Diversity 
Although federal courts developed justiciability doctrines primarily in 
the context of determining whether to adjudicate disputes presenting 
federal questions, they have applied those federal justiciability 
requirements equally to all nine categories of cases and controversies, 
including suits brought under the diversity jurisdiction provisions.129 
Under these diversity provisions, the jurisdiction of the court depends 
on the identity of the parties rather than the substance of the claim. As long 
as the parties are diverse, federal courts may hear and resolve cases 
involving only questions of state law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
stressed that when a federal court sits in diversity to hear state law claims, 
it operates simply as “another court of the State” in which it sits130 and 
accordingly must apply the state’s substantive law.131 
Although federal courts must apply state substantive law in suits 
brought under diversity jurisdiction, they do not follow state justiciability 
doctrine. Instead, federal courts have applied federal justiciability rules.132 
 
127 See id. 
128 In re Senate Resolution Relating to Senate Bill No. 65, 21 P. 478, 479 (Colo. 1889). 
129 See Pushaw, supra note 51, at 450–60. Those provisions extend the federal judicial power to 
suits between a state and citizens of another state; citizens of different states; and a state, or its citizens, 
and a foreign country or its citizens. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III also extends jurisdiction to 
suits “between two or more States.” Id. Although that provision sounds in diversity, those suits may 
raise unique concerns because they involve disputes between two sovereigns, as evidenced by the 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over those suits and the application of only federal law to 
resolve those disputes. See generally 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4045, at 151 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the procedures to account for the unique interests 
in suits between states). It therefore is not included within the argument in this Article.  
130 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945). 
131 King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948). 
132 For cases applying the federal mootness doctrine, see McNair v. Synapse Group Inc., 672 F.3d 
213, 227 (3d Cir. 2012); Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002); National 
Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco International, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1992); and Fairview Park 
Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Construction Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1126–27 (3d Cir. 1977). For cases 
applying the federal ripeness doctrine, see Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012); 
Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2010); and Camasta 
v. Omaha Steaks International, Inc., No. 12-cv-08285, 2013 WL 4495661, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 
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The one exception is standing: many federal courts have concluded that a 
dispute must satisfy both the federal and state standing requirements.133 But 
even then, when a plaintiff has standing under state law but not under 
federal law, federal courts cannot hear the suit. 
Levy v. Dial Corp. provides an illustration.134 There, Carol Levy, a 
resident of California, sued the Dial Corporation in California state court 
for violating California’s Fair Packaging and Label Act. Although Dial’s 
misconduct had not harmed Levy, Levy brought suit as a private attorney 
general, as authorized by California law.135 Dial, which was incorporated in 
Delaware and has its principal place of business in Arizona, removed the 
case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.136 The federal court 
concluded that removal was improper because Levy did not have standing 
under federal law.137 Although acknowledging that Levy had standing to 
proceed in California’s courts, the court explained that Levy did not have 
standing to proceed in federal court because she had not suffered a “distinct 
and palpable injury to [her]self.”138 The court accordingly remanded, 
forcing Dial to litigate in California state court and to face potential (or at 
least potentially perceived) state court bias.139 
Levy is but one example of this phenomenon. There are many other 
reported examples of federal courts refusing to hear suits brought under 
diversity jurisdiction based on federal justiciability doctrines even though 
those suits would be permitted in state court.140 Moreover, these reported 
 
2013). For cases applying the federal doctrine against collusive suits, see In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 
F.3d 963, 988 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, Flanagan v. Ahearn, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
Finally, for cases applying the federal advisory opinion doctrine, see McCurry ex rel. Turner v. 
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 597 (6th Cir. 2002). 
133 See, e.g., Morell v. Star Taxi, 343 F.App’x 54, 57 (6th Cir. 2009) (“When jurisdiction is 
premised on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III and state law 
in order to maintain a cause of action.”); Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host 
Corp. 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Where . . . jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of 
citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III of the Constitution and applicable state 
law . . . .”); Metro. Express Servs., Inc. v. Kansas City, 23 F.3d 1367, 1369 (8th Cir. 1994) (requiring 
standing under state law and Article III for diversity cases); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
129, § 3531.14, at 296–98 (“Federal courts have stated that state law of standing should be applied as to 
state rights in . . . diversity jurisdiction . . . . Of course state rules that recognize standing need not be 
honored if Article III requirements are not met.”). 
134 No. C-97-0537 MHP, 1997 WL 588925 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1997). 
135 See id. at *1 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2008)); see also Korea Supply Co. 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (“Standing to sue” under section 17204 
extends to “any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public”). 
136 Levy, 1997 WL 588925, at *1. 
137 Id. at *4. 
138 Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
139 Id. at *5. 
140 See, e.g., Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 935–36 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(dismissing suit brought in diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing, but 
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decisions almost certainly do not capture the full impact of applying federal 
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases.141 There are doubtless many 
unreported federal decisions concluding that a dispute that could be 
brought in state court is not justiciable under Article III.142 Following 
federal justiciability rules in diversity cases also likely results in fewer 
cases being pursued in federal court by litigants who worry that they fail 
the federal justiciability requirements.143 
II. FOLLOWING STATE JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES IN DIVERSITY 
Federal courts should not apply federal justiciability requirements to 
state law cases brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Instead, 
federal courts should follow the state justiciability requirements of the state 
in which the federal court sits.144 Doing so is consistent with the text of 
 
recognizing standing in state court); Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(dismissing claim brought under diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing, but 
recognizing standing in state court); Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(dismissing Ohio taxpayer standing against out-of-stater for lack of standing, but recognizing standing 
in Ohio court); Jenkins v. Apple, Inc., No. 11-CV-01828-LHK, 2011 WL 2619094, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
July 1, 2011) (remanding to state court on the ground that plaintiffs lacked federal standing); see also 
Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (dismissing as unripe under federal doctrines, 
without evaluating case under state ripeness doctrine); McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 227 
(3d Cir. 2012) (dismissing as moot under federal doctrines, without evaluating case under state 
mootness doctrine); Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 
2010) (dismissing as unripe under federal doctrines, without evaluating case under state ripeness 
doctrine); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (refusing to certify class 
because some members of putative class lacked federal standing, but recognizing standing in state 
court); Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (dismissing as moot under federal 
doctrines, without evaluating case under state mootness doctrine). 
141 One might think that abandoning federal standing would have little consequence because of the 
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). If a plaintiff lacks a sufficient 
stake to satisfy federal standing, he also must not satisfy the amount in controversy. Not so. Standing 
problems usually arise when plaintiffs seek an injunction that is costly for the defendant, and many 
courts have held that the defendant’s cost is an appropriate measure for the amount in controversy. See 
14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3703. In any event, the amount-in-controversy requirement does 
not affect other justiciability doctrines. 
142 See Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An 
Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2007) (“[O]nly a small fraction of district judges’ 
rulings . . . are available electronically.”). Although circuit decisions are more widely available, circuit 
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from remands for lack of jurisdiction. § 1447(d). 
Removed cases likely constitute a substantial portion of cases in which the federal courts determine that 
state but not federal justiciability requirements have been satisfied because removal reflects the 
defendant’s effort to avoid state court.  
143 See Hessick, supra note 74, at 90 (explaining that rigorous standing rules inevitably reduce the 
number of suits raising standing issues because most plaintiffs who lack standing will not spend 
resources to bring suit that will be dismissed).  
144 Applying the law of the state in which the federal courts sits is not the only possible test. What 
is important is that the federal court acts as an alternative state court. One might be able to devise a 
different test—a test that depends on something other than the location of the federal court—to 
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Article III and would better achieve diversity jurisdiction’s goal of 
providing an alternative federal forum for the resolution of state law 
claims. 
A. History and Text of the Diversity Provisions 
The history and text of the diversity provisions in Article III support 
the notion that federal courts sitting in diversity should be able to hear any 
state law case that can be brought in state court.145 To start, the diversity 
provisions of Article III do not exclude federal jurisdiction over particular 
categories of claims depending on what is at stake or the rights involved. 
Nor do they list justiciability requirements. Rather, they extend the federal 
judicial power to any controversy in which the parties are diverse.146 So 
long as the parties are diverse, the text of Article III allows a federal forum 
for any controversy that could proceed in state court. 
The term controversy itself also does not provide a basis for following 
federal instead of state justiciability requirements. At the time of 
ratification, “controversies” were understood to comprise disputes 
amenable to judicial resolution.147 But until the nineteenth century, state 
and federal courts shared a common view about what constituted a dispute 
subject to judicial resolution.148 So long as a dispute was civil, the term 
 
determine which state law applies. This Article proposes following the law of the state in which the 
federal court sits because it is consistent with Erie, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 
487, 496 (1941) (following substantive law of the state in which federal court sits), and is easily 
administered. Other proposals may produce seemingly strange results. For example, say Congress 
redesigned the district court system so that diversity claims could be brought only in district court in 
Maryland. In this example, Maryland’s justiciability rules would apply. Although that result may seem 
odd, it is no stranger than what already occurs for standing because federal courts already require 
satisfaction of state (as well as federal) standing rules in diversity cases. See supra note 133. Nor is the 
quirk unique to justiciability rules. Federal courts would likewise apply Maryland’s substantive law to 
all claims brought in diversity. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
145 One might argue that Article III should be read to allow only those actions that could be brought 
at the time of ratification. But limiting jurisdiction in that way is unwarranted because the scope of 
jurisdiction at the Founding was generally flexible. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 184 (1992) (stating that 
standing depended on the availability of a cause of action). Moreover, reading Article III to limit 
jurisdiction to what existed at the founding would undermine diversity’s goal of providing an 
alternative forum to state courts because of the ability of state law to change. 
146 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
147 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 430 (James Madison) (explaining that it was “generally 
supposed” that “the jurisdiction given” in Article III “was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature”). 
148 Fletcher, supra note 13, at 269 (“Until the end of the nineteenth century, both state and federal 
courts appear to have had a common understanding of the limits of judicial power in litigated cases.”). 
That view was that the “judicial power” was the power “to examine the truth of the fact, to determine 
the law arising upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and . . . apply 
the remedy.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25. 
109:57 (2015) Cases, Controversies, and Diversity 
79 
controversy had no bearing on the distribution of power between the 
federal and state judicial systems.149 To be sure, there is evidence that 
controversies did not include criminal cases,150 but nothing suggests that the 
Framers used the term “controversies” to prevent the federal courts from 
hearing categories of civil suits that could be brought in state court.151 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also suggests that the term “controversy” 
was not meant to impose separate federal justiciability requirements. That 
Act conferred jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature” with amounts in 
controversy exceeding $500 between a citizen of one state and a citizen of 
another or an alien.152 The use of the word “suits” instead of 
“controversies” suggests that the members of the First Congress, many of 
whom participated in the drafting of the Constitution,153 did not understand 
 
149 Fletcher, supra note 13, at 266 (“[T]he words ‘case’ and ‘controversy’ in article III were terms 
of art that were not intended to have significance for the relation between the federal and state judicial 
systems.”). 
150 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. note E at 420–21 (St. George Tucker, ed., 
Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (explaining that while the term “case” 
referred to all disputes, “whether civil or criminal,” the term “controversy” referred only to disputes “of 
a civil nature” and therefore excluded criminal cases). Modern commentators generally agree with this 
position. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party 
Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 607 n.207 (1994) (collecting scholarly articles agreeing that 
“controversies,” unlike “cases,” excludes criminal cases). Professors Amar and Pushaw have offered 
different theories. Amar has argued that the reason for the different terms “cases” and “controversies” 
was to highlight the distinction between disputes over which Congress did have the power to limit 
federal jurisdiction (“controversies”) and disputes over which it did not (“cases”). See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1656–57 
(1990). Professor Pushaw has argued that “controversy” referred to a dispute requiring resolution by a 
neutral judge. Pushaw, supra note 51, at 450. None of these theories suggests that the federal courts 
have less power than state courts in adjudicating civil cases in which the parties are diverse.  
151 Further supporting this understanding is that, unlike the “arising under” provision, the diversity 
provisions do not limit the judicial power to controversies “in law or equity.” They allow any type of 
suit—be it in law, equity, domestic relations, probate, or something else—to be heard in federal court. 
See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Against this, one might argue that 
Article III confers jurisdiction over “all cases” but omits the word “all” from controversies—a 
difference that suggests a greater ability to preclude controversies from federal court. That may be so, 
but that suggests only that Congress may limit jurisdiction, not that the Constitution does so. See Amar, 
supra note 150, at 1657. 
152 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The text of the Act actually conferred 
jurisdiction over all suits to which an alien was a party, id., but the Supreme Court interpreted the 
provision to apply only when an alien was a party against a state citizen, see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 
U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).  
153 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) (“This ‘Decision of 1789’ provides 
‘contemporaneous and weighty’ evidence of the Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of 
the First Congress ‘had taken part in framing that instrument.’” (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 790 (1983))). 
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the term “controversy” to carry a special meaning prohibiting the federal 
courts from hearing some suits that could be brought in state court.154 
Further support for this conclusion can be found in the federal and 
state courts’ shared common understandings about when a dispute was not 
amenable to judicial resolution. For example, although three state courts—
Massachusetts,155 Pennsylvania,156 and New Hampshire157—had the power 
to issue advisory opinions in response to questions posed by other 
government officials near the time of the Founding, none categorized those 
advisory opinions as the product of the exercise of the judicial power.158 
Instead, they perceived their power to render advisory opinions only as a 
power to give advice.159 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court later 
explained, “In giving such opinions, the Justices do not act as a court, but 
as the constitutional advisers.”160 Early federal judges shared this 
understanding. For instance, in 1793 the Justices refused to answer 
President Washington’s questions about France’s rights under various 
treaties, explaining that providing answers would require them to act 
“extrajudicially.”161 
The debates surrounding the adoption of the diversity provisions 
further suggest that those provisions were understood to extend federal 
jurisdiction over all types of state civil actions when the parties were 
diverse.162 For example, John Marshall, a proponent of the diversity 
provisions, explained that under the diversity provisions, federal 
 
154 Further supporting this conclusion is that the Act also conferred original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court over “controversies” between a state and citizens of another state. See § 13, 1 Stat. at 
80–81. Nothing in the Act suggests that, by using the term controversy instead of suit, Congress meant 
to confer different jurisdiction over diversity disputes depending on whether a state was a party. 
155 See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III, art. II (1780). 
156 The Report of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3 Binn. 
app. at 595 (1808) [hereinafter Report of the Judges]. 
157 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74 (1784). 
158 Fletcher, supra note 13, at 268–69. 
159 Id. 
160 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives, 126 Mass. 557, 566 (1878); 
see also Report of the Judges, 3 Binn. app. at 595, n* (describing an advisory opinion as “not 
perhaps . . . as authoritative as judicial precedent”). 
161 Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 
3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 
New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1891). English courts also shared this view. See 1 JAMES BRADLEY 
THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (1895). 
162 Although the diversity provisions received little attention at the Constitutional Convention, they 
saw substantial debate in the state ratifying conventions. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1928). However, the debate did not extend to 
alienage jurisdiction. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and 
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 10 (1996) (“Debate over the merits of alienage jurisdiction was not highly controversial at either the 
Constitutional Convention or the various state ratification conventions.”). 
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jurisdiction would be “concurrent” over the “causes [that state courts] now 
decide.”163 Opponents of the diversity provisions similarly understood the 
diversity provisions to confer broad jurisdiction. Illustrative is the argument 
of George Mason, who claimed that, by the grant of diversity jurisdiction, 
the federal courts would “absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several 
States.”164 Mason’s fear rested on the understanding that all state claims 
could potentially be encompassed in diversity.165 Other opponents indicated 
a similar belief that diversity jurisdiction extended to all suits that could be 
brought in state courts when the parties were diverse.166 In response, 
supporters did not claim that diversity jurisdiction extended to only some 
disputes. Rather, they pointed out that state courts would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over state matters when the parties were not diverse167 and 
would continue to have concurrent jurisdiction over cases when the parties 
were diverse.168 
B. Promoting the Purpose for Diversity Jurisdiction 
Applying state justiciability doctrines to state law cases brought under 
diversity jurisdiction better achieves the goal of diversity jurisdiction. 
Unlike with the grants of federal jurisdiction over particular subject areas, 
the motivation behind diversity jurisdiction was not to protect federal 
interests articulated in the Constitution or federal law.169 Instead, the 
 
163 John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), reprinted in IV THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 247 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  
164 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 638 (George Mason).  
165 Fear that the federal courts would displace the state courts was not the only objection to 
diversity jurisdiction. Others included that requiring litigation in federal court would be expensive and 
inconvenient and that diversity jurisdiction could result in expansive federal law displacing state law. 
See Friendly, supra note 162, at 490–91.  
166 PENNSYLVANIA PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA 
AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 469 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone, 
eds., Philadelphia, Historical Soc’y of Pa. 1888) (“The judicial powers . . . may be extended to every 
case, and thus absorb the State judiciaries . . . .”); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 542–43 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT] (reporting Patrick Henry’s claim that the grant of diversity jurisdiction 
would result in the “destruction of the state judiciaries”).  
167 James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution (1788), reprinted in 
IV FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 163, at 233 (responding that the state judiciaries will be “left 
uncontrolled as to the affairs of the State only”); Letter from James Madison to George Washington 
(Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in IV FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION at 228 (stating Mason’s objections left him 
“at some loss” because the “great mass of suits in every State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate 
to matters not of federal cognizance”).  
168 Marshall, supra note 163, at 247 (“State courts will not lose jurisdiction of the causes they now 
decide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the Federal Courts . . . .”). 
169 Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“Power to adjudicate between citizens of different states, merely because they are citizens 
of different states, has no relation to any substantive rights created by Congress.”). 
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primary goal of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent bias, or even the 
perception of bias, that state courts might harbor against out-of-state 
litigants.170 Diversity jurisdiction empowered federal courts to serve as 
neutral fora for the resolution of claims involving those litigants.171 That 
neutrality would result in more just decisions; placate, to some degree, 
dissatisfied litigants who might otherwise resort to extra-legal measures 
were they to lose at the hands of a biased state court;172 and facilitate 
business among the several states.173 
Consider a suit between State A and a citizen of State B. If a judge 
from State A were to hear that claim, the judge might be inclined to rule in 
favor of State A because the ruling would benefit the judge’s home state.174 
Moreover, judges who rule in favor of their home states might personally 
benefit from making such decisions because politicians in the judges’ home 
states may reward judges for doing so.175 Indeed, judges might imperil their 
careers by ruling against their states, especially in those states that do not 
guarantee life tenure or salary for state judges.176 Likewise, if State A 
 
170 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (justifying diversity 
jurisdiction on the ground that “state attachments . . . might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be 
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra 
note 2, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing diversity jurisdiction as necessary because the “state 
tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased” against out-of-staters); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 
166, at 391 (James Madison) (justifying diversity jurisdiction on the ground that “[i]t may happen that a 
strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the citizens of others, who may have claims against 
them”).  
171 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 537–38 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that, to protect 
legal rights in cases in diversity, “[I]t is necessary that [those rights] should be committed to that 
tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different states 
and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any 
bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded”); accord 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1681, at 557–60 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
172 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 467–68 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.) (stating 
that an impartial federal court could prevent appeal to “sword” and “bloodshed”); James William 
Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
17–18 (1964) (stating that before the adoption of the Constitution, states occasionally resorted to 
hostilities to resolve disputes). 
173 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 9–10 
(1928). 
174 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying diversity 
jurisdiction in part on the ground that “it would be natural that the judges, as men, should feel a strong 
predilection to the claims of their own government”). Although a judge could implement this bias 
through interpretations of law adverse to the out-of-state litigant, the precedential effect of that 
interpretation could have consequences for in-state litigants in the future. More likely, a judge would 
favor his state by making factual findings adverse to the out-of-state litigant. 
175 3 STORY, supra note 171, § 1685, at 562–64 (relating that state judges might favor their states 
for professional reasons); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 118 (2012) (noting that judges continue to be elected in about half the states). 
176 Of course, this concern could apply in a case between a state and a citizen of that same state. A 
state judge might seek to bolster his career by unjustifiably ruling in favor of the state against the 
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brought suit against a citizen of State B in a court of State B, the judge 
hearing that case might be inclined to rule against State A for similar 
reasons.177 
These considerations would have less effect on a federal judge. A 
federal judge would likely feel less allegiance to a particular state because 
that judge is a federal employee rather than a state employee. Additionally, 
federal judges are likely to feel less pressure to rule for the state because of 
Article III’s salary and tenure guarantees.178 Providing a federal forum 
could also combat against bias held by state jurors against out-of-staters.179 
Unlike with criminal juries,180 the Constitution does not require that civil 
juries be pulled from the state in which the tort was committed. Moreover, 
federal judges could remove biased jurors and instruct the jurors in a way 
that avoids bias181—actions unlikely to be taken by a biased state judge. 
Similar concerns underlay the grant of jurisdiction over suits between 
citizens of a state and foreigners. State judges and juries might favor 
parochial interests over foreign ones,182 which could not only lead to unjust 
results but also potentially jeopardize foreign relations and trade183 and 
possibly lead the nation into war.184 Providing a federal forum would 
 
citizen. But in-state litigants have recourse to the state political process—by petitioning the legislature 
to remedy an unfavorable decision or even to punish the judge. By contrast, state judges have little to 
fear from out-of-state litigants because those litigants cannot participate in the state political process.  
177 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 475–76 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“[If] a State . . . has demands against some 
citizens of another State, it is better that she should prosecute their demands in a national Court, than in 
a Court of the State to which those citizens belong; the danger of irritation and criminations arising 
from apprehensions and suspicions of partiality, being thereby obviated.”). 
178 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
179 See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 997 (2007). 
180 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury; and . . . held in the State 
where the said crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy . . . [a] trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . .”). 
181 Cf. Jones, supra note 179, at 1021 & n.98. 
182 See Johnson, supra note 162, at 14–15 (recounting debates about the bias of state courts against 
aliens). 
183 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 94–95 (2002) 
(“This penchant of the state courts to disrupt international relations and discourage foreign investment 
led directly to the alienage jurisdiction provided by Article III of the Constitution.”). 
184 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As the denial or 
perversion of justice by the sentences of courts is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it 
will follow, that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of 
other countries are concerned.”). 
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reduce these risks because it would likely be more neutral and bring a 
national perspective to disputes implicating foreign relations.185 
Providing a neutral forum for resolving state law claims was also the 
reason behind extending federal jurisdiction to controversies between 
citizens of different states, though there is disagreement over the precise 
type of bias that state courts would harbor. The traditional theory is that 
state courts would discriminate, or at least be perceived to discriminate, 
against out-of-state litigants in favor of in-state litigants for the same reason 
that those judges might discriminate against out-of-staters in suits against 
the state itself—a sense of allegiance to the state and an effort to advance 
their careers.186 A different theory, most famously articulated by Henry 
Friendly, argues that the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction was to protect, 
not out-of-state litigants, but creditors.187 According to this view, diversity 
jurisdiction was a response to the economic crisis of the late 1780s that led 
the legislatures and courts of poorer states to favor in-state debtors over 
creditors, who generally were from out of state.188 The belief was that the 
federal courts would be more inclined to protect creditors189—a belief that 
generally proved to be true in practice.190 In any event, despite the 
disagreement over the precise nature of the feared bias, all agree that the 
purpose behind federal diversity jurisdiction was to combat bias by 
providing an alternative federal forum for claims where the parties were 
diverse. 
Protecting against potential state court bias in disputes between 
diverse parties depends on the ability to extend federal jurisdiction to all 
cases that could be brought in state court and in which the parties are 
diverse.191 Overlaying Article III justiciability doctrines in diversity cases 
 
185 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1622–23 (2008) (“These 
provisions provided an unbiased forum with a national perspective to resolve disputes that could affect 
the United States’ relationship with foreign nations.”).  
186 3 STORY, supra note 171, § 1690, at 567 (stating that state judges would be naturally inclined to 
favor interests of citizens from their state over citizens from other states); id. § 1685, at 562–64 (stating 
that state judges have professional interest in ruling for citizens of their state). 
187 Friendly, supra note 162, at 498–99. According to Friendly, there was virtually no evidence of 
state bias against out-of-state litigants or that diversity was conferred to combat such bias. See id. at 
493. Other commentators, however, have stressed that it was the potential for bias, as opposed to actual 
bias, against out-of-staters that led to the grant of diversity. See John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the 
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24 (1948). 
188 Jones, supra note 179, at 1012–13 (claiming that state legislatures set aside verdicts favorable to 
creditors, discharged debts, and undertook other actions adverse to creditors).  
189 Friendly, supra note 162, at 496–97. 
190 Jones, supra note 179, at 1015 (“The empirical evidence suggests that the federal courts were 
indeed more conducive to creditor interests than the state courts, and that British creditors frequently 
utilized the federal courts during the early decades of the nation’s existence.”). 
191 Some cases in which the parties are diverse may also fall within another jurisdictional provision 
of Article III. For example, a case in which the parties are diverse may also “aris[e] under” federal law. 
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undermines that goal.192 It may prevent federal courts from hearing those 
claims because of the difference between federal and state justiciability 
doctrines. Diverse parties therefore may be forced into state court to litigate 
their claims, despite the threat of bias against the out-of-state party.193 
Coyne v. American Tobacco Co. provides an example.194 There, Ohio 
taxpayers filed a state law restitution claim in Ohio state court against out-
of-state tobacco companies, demanding that the companies return to Ohio 
money that the state had spent on treating victims of disease caused by 
tobacco use. The tobacco companies removed to federal court based on 
diversity of citizenship.195 It seems highly likely that the decision to remove 
was motivated by fear that an Ohio state court judge would be predisposed 
to supporting efforts to help Ohio and its victims of illness from smoking.196 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that removal was improper.197 It reasoned that, 
although Ohio courts recognize standing in state court based on taxpayer 
status, it is not a basis for standing in federal court.198 The tobacco 
companies accordingly were compelled to litigate in Ohio state court, just 
as Dial was forced to litigate in California state court in the suit brought by 
California citizens.199 
 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The reason for those other bases for jurisdiction was not to prevent possible 
discrimination against certain litigants, but to protect federal interests and secure uniformity in federal 
law. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton). Still, when another 
jurisdictional basis applies, the fear of bias against out-of-staters provides an independent reason for 
federal jurisdiction. 
192 To be sure, the Framers recognized that in some cases the threat of bias may be so small as not 
to warrant the cost of conferring federal jurisdiction by empowering Congress to confer less than the 
entirety of diversity jurisdiction authorized by Article III. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 
(1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated 
controversies.”); see also The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (stating that Congress may 
likewise limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). But to fulfill the purpose of the diversity 
provisions, Congress must have the ability to extend federal jurisdiction to all cases in which the parties 
are diverse, if it deems the threat of bias too great. 
193 A state could conceivably seek to bias out-of-staters by limiting certain causes of action to 
taxpayers or concerned citizens to force out-of-state suits into state court. But that arrangement is 
unlikely because, to avoid constitutional problems, those limitations would apply to in-state litigants as 
well, and would likely be unpopular. Moreover, limiting causes of action in this way would not prevent 
federal actions in a predictable way because whether federal justiciability is satisfied depends not on the 
cause of action invoked, but instead on whether there is actual or imminent injury and adversity. 
194 183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999). 
195 Id. at 491.  
196 Further evidence of the belief that the Ohio courts would favor the taxpayers is that the 
taxpayers vigorously sought remand to state court. Id. at 491–92. 
197 Id. at 494. 
198 Id. at 495. 
199 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
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C. Parity Between Federal and State Courts 
Applying state justiciability doctrines would also promote parity 
between the state and federal courts. As the Supreme Court explained in the 
context of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,200 one of the assumptions underlying 
diversity jurisdiction is that the enforceability of state rights should not 
depend on whether a suit is brought in state or federal court.201 Because 
federal courts sitting in diversity are acting as alternative state courts, 
parties should have the same rights whether their cases proceed in state or 
federal court.202 To provide different rights in state and federal court would 
lead to unacceptably different results depending on where the suit is filed 
and would encourage forum shopping.203 
Of course, Erie requires only that federal courts apply state substantive 
law.204 Although scholars have challenged the idea that justiciability is 
separate from substance,205 federal courts have consistently treated 
justiciability as separate from substantive law, based on the theory that it 
does not set forth rights but instead defines whether a court may decide a 
dispute.206 But the same concerns motivating Erie extend to justiciability.207 
Erie’s premise is that the scope of state rights cannot vary depending on 
whether suit is brought in state or federal court because the same state 
substantive law empowers both the federal and state court to provide 
 
200 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
201 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945). (“[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a 
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in 
effect, only another court of the State, it cannot . . . substantially affect the enforcement of the right as 
given by the State.”). 
202 Id. 
203 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (“The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that 
it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been 
brought in a federal court.”); Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1865, 1893–1900 (2013) (rules that lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of justice are 
inconsistent with the goal of providing an unbiased federal forum). 
204 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, 
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”). 
205 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 12, at 234 (arguing that standing should be considered a merits 
determination); Lee, supra note 12, at 669 (making a similar argument for mootness). 
206 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011) (distinguishing the merits from 
justiciability). 
207 This is not to say that federal courts must have the same jurisdiction as state courts. Congress 
may confer less than the full scope of diversity jurisdiction on federal courts. The point is that federal 
courts should be available, if Congress deems it wise, to operate as alternative state courts for enforcing 
state rights to the same extent as state courts.  
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relief.208 Federal courts need not follow state procedures, but they must 
enforce the same rights. 
Although justiciability rules may seem procedural in the sense that 
they regulate courts instead of individuals, categorizing them solely as 
procedural is wrong. Justiciability rules do not simply prescribe “the 
manner and the means” by which rights are enforced.209 Instead, they define 
the “rules of decision” for adjudicating rights by imposing various 
requirements on litigants, such as that they have a sufficient stake in the 
dispute and that their interests be adverse.210 Those requirements do not 
simply determine the means by which a court decides a dispute; rather, they 
relate to conduct outside the courtroom by defining when an individual has 
a cognizable grievance for which he can obtain judicial redress. 
Thus, by following federal instead of state justiciability doctrines in 
diversity cases, federal courts functionally enforce different rights than 
state courts.211 This difference in the scope of rights may result in different 
outcomes in state and federal court and lead litigants to forum shop to 
avoid particular outcomes—the two evils that the Erie doctrine seeks to 
prevent.212 Indeed, the understanding that justiciability should be treated 
similarly to substantive law for Erie purposes underlies the practice of the 
lower federal courts to require plaintiffs to satisfy state (as well as federal) 
standing rules for state law claims brought under diversity jurisdiction.213 
Even so, one might argue that state law should have no bearing on 
justiciability in federal court, because federal justiciability turns on the 
meaning of cases and controversies in Article III.214 But the fact that federal 
 
208 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 (stating the goal of Erie was to avoid having “rights . . . vary according 
to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court” (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938))). 
209 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010) (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)) (noting that procedural 
rules can only govern “the manner and the means” by which rights are enforced). 
210 Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp., 326 U.S. at 446) (stating that procedural rules may not alter the 
“rules of decision” for adjudicating rights). 
211 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (2006) (arguing that limitations on 
jurisdiction affect enforceability of rights); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 209 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[A] right without a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement by 
a diversity suit in a federal court sitting in the state.” (citing Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–
09 (1945))). 
212 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 
468). In this sense, justiciability is not procedural. Unlike procedural rules, justiciability does not 
simply regulate “the manner and the means” by which rights are enforced; it defines the “rules of 
decision” for adjudicating rights by requiring litigants to have adequate interests. Shady Grove, 559 
U.S. at 407. 
213 See supra note 133. 
214 Cf. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (explaining that under the Erie doctrine, state substantive law 
does not apply if the matter is governed by the Constitution). 
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justiciability is a question of constitutional law does not preclude following 
state justiciability rules in diversity cases. The Constitution often 
incorporates aspects of state law. For example, state law often determines 
what constitutes “property” under the Due Process and Takings Clauses,215 
and it is central to determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment.216 The rationale for following state law in 
those situations is that doing so is necessary to implement those 
constitutional provisions sensibly.217 That same rationale applies to the 
justiciability of claims brought under diversity. The motivation for 
diversity jurisdiction was to provide an alternative federal forum for state 
law disputes between diverse parties, and following state justiciability rules 
ensures that federal courts can hear any civil suit meeting that 
description.218 In that light, state justiciability doctrines should inform the 
meaning of “controversies” in diversity cases. This is not to say that federal 
justiciability should be a question of state law—it should not be. Whether 
disputes in federal court constitute “controversies” is a constitutional 
question. Rather, the point is that state law should give content to the 
meaning of the term “controversies.” 
The argument for following state justiciability doctrines is all the 
stronger when viewing the rules of federal justiciability as judicially 
created rather than compelled by the text of Article III.219 When courts 
create doctrine implementing vague constitutional text, they should seek to 
accomplish the goals underlying the text being implemented so as to avoid 
accusations of unbridled judicial lawmaking.220 Following state 
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases best accomplishes the goal of 
allowing federal courts to function as alternative state courts.221 
 
215 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“[Property interests] are 
created . . . by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law . . . .”); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163–64 (1998) (applying same 
analysis to takings). 
216 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2010) (looking to state law to determine the national 
consensus). 
217 See id.; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
218 See supra Part II.B. 
219 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 
98 (1991) (stating that, when creating federal common law, federal courts should “incorporat[e] [state 
law] as the federal rule of decision” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, 
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979))). 
220 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1997) (describing doctrine as effort to implement 
constitutional values). 
221 Applying state justiciability doctrines would also have the potential to improve justiciability 
doctrine overall. The process of applying a variety of different state justiciability doctrines would 
provide federal judges with insights on ways to improve federal justiciability doctrines, an area of law 
known for its complexity and incoherence. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of 
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Following state justiciability rules would undermine uniformity in 
justiciability rules in federal court because different states have different 
justiciability rules. But there is no federal interest in establishing a uniform 
rule of justiciability for state law suits brought under diversity jurisdiction. 
To the contrary, the diversity provisions implement the federal interest in 
protecting out-of-state interests from the real or perceived biases of state 
courts, and following state justiciability doctrines better achieves that 
goal.222 Although doing so may lead to differences among federal courts in 
different states,223 it creates greater uniformity between federal courts and 
the courts of the states in which they sit—a preferable outcome given that 
federal courts function as state courts under diversity jurisdiction.224 
Nor would following state justiciability doctrines imperil some other 
important federal interest. The current federal justiciability doctrines are 
not an essential characteristic of the federal judiciary.225 They are neither 
dictated by the text of Article III nor have they always been understood to 
be critical to defining federal jurisdiction. To the contrary, with the possible 
exceptions of the political question doctrine and the advisory opinion 
doctrine,226 these doctrines are relatively recent judicial creations, and they 
continue to evolve even today.227 Moreover, unlike cases presenting federal 
or constitutional questions or suits involving the United States, suits 
involving only issues of state law brought under diversity jurisdiction do 
not inherently implicate national interests. They involve questions of 
 
Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 123 (2000) (noting the value 
of dialogue between state and federal courts in developing individual rights); Martin H. Redish, 
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal 
Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (1992) (discussing the value of 
“cross-pollination” between state and federal courts in developing doctrine). Likewise, federal judges 
would have opportunities to suggest ways to improve state justiciability doctrines in the course of 
applying those doctrines. 
222 See supra Parts II.A–B. 
223 Federal justiciability determinations already vary because of state law. For example, federal 
courts require satisfaction of both state and federal standing requirements. See supra note 133. Further, 
state law may affect the existence of federal standing. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that 
his alleged injury in fact is judicially cognizable—that is, the injury must involve the “violation of a 
legally protected right.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772–73 
(2000). State law may provide the legal right that renders an injury cognizable. See, e.g., Booker-El v. 
Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899–900 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that state law 
creates cognizable interests for standing). 
224 Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941) (explaining that although 
Erie leads to lack of uniformity in substantive law, that “lack of uniformity . . . is attributable to our 
federal system”). 
225 Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958) (holding that right to a 
jury is an essential characteristic of federal courts under the Seventh Amendment and therefore that 
federal courts must empanel juries for state law claims even when state law permits a bench trial).  
226 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
227 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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importance only to the state.228 One might argue that federal courts should 
follow state justiciability rules but only as long as they do not conflict with 
the case or controversy requirement of Article III. But that simply begs the 
question, because justiciability provides the basis for defining what 
constitutes a case or controversy in the first place. Article III does not 
define those terms, and courts must develop these doctrines through 
reference to another source. 
To be sure, it may seem that the rationale behind some state 
justiciability doctrines does not extend to federal courts. For example, one 
reason behind the exceptions to the usual justiciability requirements for 
cases presenting issues of public importance is to allow the state court to 
resolve recurrent issues by writing precedential opinions.229 That reason 
applies less to federal courts because their determinations of state law have 
limited precedential value.230 But fashioning binding precedent is not the 
only reason for this exception; otherwise, the exception would not be 
available to state trial courts that cannot issue opinions that bind in future 
cases. Another reason for the exception is to allow a court to issue a 
binding judgment on the parties in a particular dispute to resolve the 
dispute with respect to those parties, and federal courts can equally fill this 
function. Although some of the reasons underlying some state justiciability 
might not support federal jurisdiction, most of those doctrines have 
multiple goals, and many of those goals do support federal jurisdiction. 
III. THE REASONS FOR FEDERAL JUSTICIABILITY 
The prior Part explained that applying separate federal justiciability 
doctrines in state law diversity actions conflicts with the purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction. One might argue, however, that the reasons for 
federal justiciability doctrines nevertheless warrant the application of those 
doctrines to diversity cases. But that is not so. The rationales underlying 
federal justiciability doctrines do not extend to diversity cases that turn 
solely on state law. The main rationale for federal justiciability—separation 
of powers—does not apply to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction 
because the other branches of the federal government have no role in the 
creation or enforcement of state law. The other major rationale offered by 
courts—institutional competence—likewise does not justify following 
federal justiciability doctrines because state law should determine when a 
 
228 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3531.14, at 298 (“Federal concepts of standing 
developed to regulate enforcement of federal rights do not represent any independent interest of the 
federal courts that justifies disregarding state law in [diversity cases].”).  
229 See, e.g., In re Commitment of Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 2006) (recognizing 
exception to mootness for recurrent issues).  
230 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941) (describing a federal 
court determination of state law as merely a “forecast rather than a determination”). 
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court is competent to resolve a state law dispute. Nor do other reasons 
sometimes given for the federal justiciability doctrines—fairness and 
conservation of judicial resources—justify the use of those doctrines in 
state law diversity cases. 
A. Separation of Powers 
Separation of powers is the central idea underlying the justiciability 
doctrines implementing Article III.231 According to the Supreme Court, the 
case or controversy provisions of Article III “define the role assigned to the 
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the 
President, and Congress.232 Federal justiciability doctrines implement those 
provisions by ensuring that the federal courts stay within their sphere of 
power and do not “usurp the powers of the political branches.”233 
As noted in Part I, the appropriate role of the federal judiciary is a 
matter of dispute. Some argue that the federal courts should be limited to 
enforcing private rights, whereas others contend that the federal courts 
should take a more active role in articulating and policing legal norms.234 
Both models recognize, however, that constraints must be placed on the 
judiciary to avoid undue interference with Congress and the President.235 
The difference between the models lies only in where to define the 
boundaries between the judicial power and the legislative and executive 
powers. 
But that debate has no place in diversity cases that depend solely on 
state law. Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction over state law 
disputes pose no threat to the powers of President or Congress. Neither 
does Congress have any say over the content of state law,236 nor does the 
President have any involvement in the enforcement of state law.237 The role 
of federal courts in those cases is not to vindicate national interests.238 
 
231 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that justiciability is “built on a single basic 
idea—the idea of separation of powers”); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
1146–47 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .”). 
232 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).  
233 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146. 
234 See supra Part I.A. 
235 Siegel, supra note 8, at 123, 125 (arguing that even under a “special functions” model, “courts 
would still play only a ‘proper—and properly limited—role . . . in a democratic society’” (quoting Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984))). 
236 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot direct 
enactment of state laws). 
237 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to control 
enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated). 
238 To be sure, one of the fears motivating diversity was that forcing out-of-staters or foreigners 
into state court could lead dissatisfied litigants to violence. But there is no generalized national interest 
in preventing violence; otherwise, all cases could be brought in federal court. 
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Instead, the federal courts operate as alternative state courts, resolving 
issues of state law.239 Thus, for those state law disputes, the separation of 
powers concerns underlying federal justiciability doctrines do not apply. 
To be sure, concerns about separation of powers may be greater in 
suits between diverse parties that do not turn solely on state law, but 
instead also raise questions of federal or constitutional law. Article III 
extends the judicial power to such suits both because the parties are diverse 
and because the cases arise under federal law240—how the court resolves a 
federal or constitutional question may affect the federal government’s 
interests. Accordingly, there may be reason to apply federal justiciability 
principles in those cases, even when the parties are diverse.241 But when a 
dispute does not present a federal or constitutional question, as is the case 
for many disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction, those separation-of-
powers concerns do not apply.242 
 
239 England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426–27 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“The diversity jurisdiction . . . was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity . . . to 
assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state courts.” (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter 
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943))). Diversity jurisdiction, therefore, is an exception to the general rule 
that the powers of the branches of the federal government are commensurate. See Henry J. Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394–95 (1964). It 
allows courts to hear cases involving matters beyond the jurisdiction of the President and Congress 
when the parties are diverse. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435–36 (1793) (opinion of 
Iredell, J.) (“Where certain parties are concerned, although the subject in controversy does not relate to 
any of the special objects of authority of the general Government, . . . the general Government has a 
Judicial Authority in regard to such subjects of controversy . . . .”). 
240 Although Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), holds that Article 
III’s arising under provision extends to those cases in which federal law forms an unlitigated ingredient 
of the case, the Court has questioned whether that interpretation of Article III is too broad. See 
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1983) (noting the question but 
declining to resolve it). In any event, separation of powers concerns are minimal when a federal issue is 
merely an underlying ingredient instead of a disputed matter in a case, because such cases do not 
present an occasion for the courts to rule on the federal issue. The argument in this Article accordingly 
extends to that circumstance. 
241 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), Congress has limited “arising under” jurisdiction to cases in 
which the cause of action presents a federal question. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 807–08 (1986). That statute does not confer federal jurisdiction over cases that present only a 
federal defense, even though those cases “arise under” federal law for Article III purposes. See id. In 
those cases, diverse parties seeking to litigate in federal court must invoke diversity jurisdiction. Still, 
there may be separation of powers concerns warranting the application of the federal justiciability 
doctrines if those cases turn on federal law.  
242 One might argue that, when a plaintiff brings a state law claim under diversity jurisdiction and a 
federal claim arising from the same transaction, those claims form the same case and, therefore, that the 
federal justiciability requirements should apply to the state law claim. But the Court has consistently 
refused to treat multiple claims as a single case in evaluating justiciability. Instead, it has evaluated 
justiciability independently for each claim. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352–53 
(2006) (refusing to apply supplemental jurisdiction to justiciability); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (arguing that standing for past harm does not establish standing to seek 
prospective relief). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law 
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Although following state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity 
cases would not lead federal courts to infringe on the other branches of the 
federal government, one might argue that applying state doctrines 
nevertheless violates the separation of powers by expanding the power of 
the judiciary. The Supreme Court has espoused this view. It has explained 
that Article III confers on the federal courts the power to decide only those 
disputes “traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial 
process,”243 and for a federal court to exercise power beyond these 
historical limitations violates the separation of powers.244 According to the 
Court, the federal justiciability doctrines ensure that the federal courts are 
limited to that historical role.245 
It may be that limiting the federal judiciary to its historical role was 
the origin of some federal justiciability doctrines. But federal justiciability 
doctrines have evolved over time, and they no longer limit the federal 
judiciary to its historical role. For example, historically, whether a plaintiff 
had standing did not depend on whether he had suffered injury in fact; 
rather, standing depended on whether the plaintiff had invoked the proper 
form of action.246 The Supreme Court first created the injury in fact test in 
1970.247 Mootness doctrine has changed as well. It was only in 1911, for 
example, that the Court first recognized the capable of repetition yet 
evading review exception,248 and the scope of that exception has changed 
over time.249 Ripeness has undergone a similar evolution: courts now hear 
some cases that historically would not have been ripe.250 So, too, for the 
 
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1984) (summarizing and 
criticizing doctrine). By that rationale, a single justiciability doctrine need not apply to state and federal 
claims in one case. Instead, state claims may be evaluated under state justiciability doctrines, whereas 
federal claims may be evaluated under federal doctrines. 
243 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102. 
244 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (limiting federal justiciability to 
disputes “‘historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process’ . . . ensures that we 
act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives” (quoting Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))). But see Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (suggesting that limiting courts to 
their historical function is independent from separation of powers). 
245 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. 
246 See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 184. 
247 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224. 
248 See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515–16 (1911); see also David H. Donaldson, 
Jr., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part One—The Continuing 
Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1306 (1976) (discussing development of the exception). 
249 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 335–36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that, under 
original exception, plaintiff had to demonstrate that he faced a reasonable probability of suffering the 
harm again, but that exception was expanded to include instances where someone else faced a threat of 
facing the harm).  
250 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (finding ripe a claim that global 
warming might cause coastal damage in several decades), with Attorney Gen. v. Kingston-on-Thames, 
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prohibition on nonadversarial suits: In 1804, the Supreme Court resolved a 
case while acknowledging that it involved only “a feigned issue.”251 
Following state justiciability doctrines in diversity cases may actually 
better align with history. Historically, justiciability was not clearly separate 
from substantive law. Courts could hear a claim when a party “assert[ed] 
his rights in the form prescribed by law”252—a requirement that sounds in 
the merits. Because federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law,253 applying that historical test today would lead federal 
courts sitting in diversity to follow state justiciability rules as well—
because it would require federal courts to reconceptualize justiciability as 
substantive law.254 Further, many state justiciability doctrines actually hew 
more closely to the historical line than the federal doctrines. For example, 
in some states, standing turns on whether the plaintiff properly states a 
claim255—a requirement that closely mirrors the historical rule that 
justiciability depended on plaintiffs asserting their rights “in the form 
prescribed by law.”256 
There may be situations where the state defines its judicial power to 
extend far beyond the traditional notion of the judicial power. For example, 
a state may redefine its “judicial power” to include the power to issue 
nonbinding opinions.257 Although the Supreme Court has stated that the 
 
(1865) 34 H.L. 481 at 487 (Eng.) (deeming unripe a claim against dumping sewage into the Thames 
because any harm from dumping might not arise for “a hundred years hence”). 
251 Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34 (1804). 
252 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (“[The judicial] power is 
capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form 
prescribed by law.”); see also Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (stating that Article III 
is satisfied “[w]henever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts according to the regular 
course of legal procedure, and that remedy is pursued”). Professors Woolhandler and Nelson have 
argued that historically merely stating a cause of action was insufficient to create standing. See Ann 
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 721 
(2004). But the earliest example they provide is from 1911, id. (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 
U.S. 346 (1911)), by which time justiciability doctrines had already departed from their roots. 
253 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
254 See Hessick, supra note 18, at 425. 
255 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
256 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819. 
257 The hypothetical is farfetched because it would be a poor use of resources and depart from the 
common understanding of the judicial power among the states. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 
U.S. 211, 224 (1995) (recounting the shared historical view of states that the judicial power is the power 
to render binding judgments). One can imagine even more outlandish hypotheticals, such as redefining 
the judicial power to include the power to legislate. Assuming such arrangements are constitutional, but 
see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government), and that the 
diversity requirement could be satisfied, federal courts should have the Article III power to hear cases 
brought under this scheme but also the power to abstain or deny the remedy if appropriate, see infra 
note 305. 
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federal judicial power is the power to render dispositive judgments,258 
federal courts sitting in diversity should still follow the state laws of 
justiciability in those situations.259 
By authorizing an individual to bring suit that has the remedy of 
obtaining a judicial opinion on the law, the state law has conferred on that 
individual a right to know the law, and it has prescribed a remedy for a 
violation of that right—a nonbinding opinion from the courts. For 
justiciability purposes, the suit is no different from any other suit in which 
the individual seeks to vindicate a right—the traditional basis for 
justiciability in federal courts and still a common ground for justiciability 
in state courts.260 The objection to empowering a court to issue a 
nonbinding opinion is one of remedy. But as the Court recognized long 
ago, Article III does not “crystallize” the remedies available.261 Legislatures 
may create new remedies, and if a state determines that its courts should 
have the power to vindicate rights through the remedy of a nonbinding 
opinion, federal courts sitting as alternative state courts in diversity should 
have that same power. To the extent that the remedy is a poor use of 
judicial resources, Congress may limit diversity jurisdiction through 
legislation, and courts may develop doctrines of abstention.262 But the 
deficiency of the remedy should not categorically prohibit a federal court 
from hearing the dispute. 
B. Institutional Competence 
The Supreme Court has said “the business of federal courts” is to 
resolve “questions presented in an adversary context.”263 For a dispute to be 
sufficiently adverse, it must have at least two opposing parties, each of 
which is asserting conflicting rights and each of which has a stake in 
winning the dispute.264 According to the Court, this adverseness is 
necessary to “sharpen[] the presentation of issues upon which the court so 
largely depends.”265 In other words, adverseness promotes better litigation, 
 
258 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219. 
259 The diversity requirement would not be obviously satisfied because a request for an opinion 
need not be brought against another party. But one can imagine a statute authorizing suit against another 
simply to obtain a judicial pronouncement. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (authorizing declaratory 
judgments). 
260 See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 233. 
261 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (holding declaratory judgments 
justiciable). 
262 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (identifying 
various forms of abstention). See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 580–85 (1985) (summarizing this area of law). 
263 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
264 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2008).  
265 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
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which leads to better judicial decisions266—and the federal justiciability 
doctrines ensure this adverseness.267 
This rationale does not support applying federal justiciability doctrines 
to state law cases in diversity. State law dictates when state courts are 
competent to act.268 Because federal courts act as state courts when hearing 
state law suits in diversity, that same state law should determine when 
federal courts are competent to hear those claims. States may adopt a 
different understanding of when a dispute is sufficiently adverse for 
judicial resolution, and many have done so through their differing 
justiciability doctrines.269 
One might argue that adverseness is more beneficial to federal than 
state judges because federal judges know less about state law than state 
courts. That argument does not account for those states that demand more 
adverseness than is required under federal doctrines.270 More important, 
whether federal judges know less state law than state judges is an empirical 
question. Some federal judges may actually know state law better than 
some judges of that state because federal judges are often picked from 
among leaders of the state bars.271 Moreover, not all state judges know state 
law equally. There is always a risk that a state judge, especially a newly 
appointed one, is unfamiliar with a particular area of law in a dispute. State 
laws permitting judicial resolution of disputes in the absence of substantial 
adverseness operates on the premise that, irrespective of a particular 
judge’s knowledge and experience, that judge is capable of resolving that 
dispute without the adverseness required by federal justiciability doctrine. 
Thus, even if federal courts would benefit from greater adverseness, that 
adverseness is not necessary to adjudicate the state claim.272 In any event, 
the federal justiciability doctrines are not particularly effective at ensuring 
high-quality advocacy. An interest group that does not have a sufficient 
 
266 Hessick, supra note 50, at 322.  
267 E.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2011) (invoking adversity to justify mootness); 
Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (invoking adversity to justify standing). 
268 Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 
9662) (opinion of Story, J.) (“The states . . . have a right to limit, control, and restrict their judicial 
functions, and jurisdiction, according to their own mere pleasure.”). 
269 See supra Part I.B. 
270 See, e.g., Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Or. 2004) (rejecting the capable of repetition 
yet evading review exception to mootness). 
271 Sandra D. O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the 
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 812 (1981) (“[M]any appointments 
to the federal bench are from state court benches.”). 
272 Indeed, federal courts may be better equipped to resolve cases in the absence of strong advocacy 
because of their access to greater resources. See William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in 
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1744 (1992). 
Moreover, if an issue proves particularly difficult to resolve, the federal court may certify the question 
to the state supreme court. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 74 (1997). 
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stake to satisfy the justiciability requirements may nevertheless litigate 
more vigorously than an individual who actually has a sufficient stake.273 
A second argument supporting greater adverseness for federal courts is 
that resolving legal questions in a non-adverse context resembles 
lawmaking more than adjudication, and state judiciaries may more 
appropriately engage in lawmaking because their members may be subject 
to elections.274 This argument does not extend to those states in which 
judges are not elected, which amounts to about half the states.275 
More importantly, this argument rests on the false assumption that 
federal justiciability doctrines actually guarantee adverseness. Various 
federal doctrines allow federal courts to resolve disputes even when the 
parties are not adverse. For example, under the capable of repetition yet 
evading review exception to mootness, a court will not dismiss a claim that 
is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will 
again engage in the complained-of conduct. In that situation, the plaintiff 
no longer has a real stake in the case—an order favorable to the plaintiff 
will not provide the plaintiff with tangible relief—yet the courts have 
deemed themselves competent to resolve the dispute. Similarly, the 
interests required to satisfy federal justiciability doctrines need not be tied 
to the merits of the case. For example, the injuries giving rise to federal 
standing often have no bearing on the legal issue before the court,276 and 
once a court finds standing, it may discuss any legal issue in its decision.277 
The adverseness ensured by standing, therefore, has no bearing on the issue 
on which the court may make new law. Indeed, in its most recent decision 
on standing, the Court itself said that the adverseness basis for justiciability 
is merely a prudential consideration.278 
 
273 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983).  
274 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1185 (1999). Finally, that state judges may be subject to elections is a 
reason why federalism should not limit justiciability in cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. 
Judges facing elections are more likely to be biased in favor of their state and its citizens against out-of-
state litigants. See Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”: A Public Choice Model of 
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313–14 (1997) (arguing 
that, under public choice theory, elected judges will aim to please the electorate). 
275 Issacharoff, supra note 175, at 118. 
276 David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for 
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 823–24 (2004) (arguing that justiciability 
requirements usually do not affect a court’s analysis of the merits). 
277 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1249, 1269 (2006) (noting the widespread acceptance of dicta). 
278 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013). 
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C. Fairness 
Another reason given for federal justiciability doctrines is that they 
serve the interest of fairness.279 According to this theory, rightsholders 
should have the prerogative to determine whether to enforce their rights; 
third parties should not be permitted to raise the rights of others who do not 
want to enforce their own rights or have not yet had an opportunity to do 
so.280 Federal justiciability doctrines protect this structure by allowing only 
those with a substantial stake in a dispute to pursue litigation.281 
But what constitutes a substantial enough stake to warrant litigation is 
a question of law. Under federal doctrine, any amount of money constitutes 
a sufficient interest to invoke the judicial process,282 but emotional distress, 
even when severe, resulting from observing the government’s or some 
other person’s illegal conduct, is not.283 State doctrines often draw a 
different line. For example, some states have decreed that ensuring 
government compliance with the law is an adequate interest to invoke the 
judiciary.284 
The law that creates a right also establishes who has an adequate basis 
to enforce that right. For example, a law authorizing all people to bring suit 
to enforce a permitting requirement for property improvements creates in 
all people an interest in the enforcement of the requirement.285 Because a 
federal court faced with a state law suit brought under diversity jurisdiction 
must enforce that right to the same degree as state courts,286 that same state 
law should dictate which individuals have a sufficient interest to seek to 
enforce that law. 
D. Judicial Resources 
Another reason for federal justiciability doctrines is to deploy 
effectively finite judicial resources.287 Federal courts have limited time and 
 
279 See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979).  
280 Id. at 310. 
281 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 473 (1982) (“[S]tanding also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be 
most directly affected by a judicial order.”). 
282 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 
(1973) (allowing suit based on any “identifiable trifle”). 
283 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486. 
284 See, e.g., New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 290–91 (N.M. 2011) (granting 
standing when “the Governor and the Secretary have exceeded the limits of their constitutional 
powers”); Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (Ohio 1999) (basing 
standing on interest in preventing unconstitutional legislation). 
285 See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 234–35. 
286 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945). 
287 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at § 2.1, 43–44. 
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money. They also have limited political capital: Federal courts depend on 
other institutions to enforce their orders, and if a court enters too many 
disfavored decisions, those other institutions may refuse to enforce the 
federal orders.288 Federal justiciability doctrines let the federal courts 
expend these resources effectively by screening out those disputes ill-suited 
for judicial resolution. 
Following state justiciability doctrines is unlikely to result in a 
substantial increase in the expenditure of federal judicial resources. State 
judiciaries also have finite resources, and states have an interest in 
expending those resources wisely. Presumably, one way that states 
accomplish that goal is through their justiciability doctrines. Although 
some states may have more permissive justiciability doctrines than the 
federal ones, their need to conserve resources supports the idea that the 
greater scope of justiciability does not overly tax the state court system. 
Requiring federal courts to follow state justiciability doctrines in diversity 
thus would not likely result in a substantial increase in the expenditure of 
federal resources. 
Of course, the differences in state and federal justiciability doctrines 
may result in federal courts expending their resources differently under 
state justiciability doctrines than they would under federal justiciability 
doctrines. But state law should control which state claims warrant judicial 
attention. To allocate federal resources according to federal doctrines is to 
prioritize federal over state interests in cases that present no federal 
interest. 
To the extent state justiciability doctrines do result in a poor use of 
federal judicial resources, Congress may redirect the use of those federal 
judicial resources by limiting diversity jurisdiction through statute, as it has 
done with the amount in controversy requirement,289 which prevents federal 
courts from expending resources under diversity jurisdiction on small 
disputes.290 
IV. FEDERALISM AND DISPARITY OBJECTIONS 
Although the rationales underlying federal justiciability doctrines do 
not justify applying those doctrines to diversity cases, there may be other 
reasons to apply federal justiciability in those cases. One might argue that 
federal justiciability doctrines protect federalism or that following state 
 
288 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 116 (2d ed. 1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 55–59 (1980).  
289 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).  
290 Indeed, Congress could mandate through legislation the current federal justiciability 
requirements in diversity cases. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
100 
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases leads to unwarranted disparities in 
justiciability between cases presenting federal questions and cases brought 
under diversity. But neither objection warrants applying federal instead of 
state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity cases. 
A. Federalism 
Federalism defines the distribution of power between the federal and 
state governments.291 Under our political system, states have general 
regulatory power.292 By contrast, the federal government is one of limited 
powers.293 It may exercise only those powers enumerated in the 
Constitution and cannot exercise those powers left to the states. One might 
argue that the federal justiciability doctrines protect this division of power 
by limiting the federal judiciary’s ability to meddle in state affairs. 
But federalism should not limit the power of federal courts to exercise 
diversity jurisdiction. The very point of diversity jurisdiction is to enable 
federal courts to hear issues of state law that might not involve federal 
interests.294 Diversity thus is a departure from the ordinary balance of 
power between the state and federal governments.295 Although allowing 
federal courts to hear state issues may imperil state sovereignty to some 
degree,296 the Founders thought this jurisdiction was necessary to maintain 
order and the rule of law among the states. 
Even if federalism does prohibit federal courts from hearing certain 
state matters, federal justiciability doctrines are not targeted at that goal. 
Federal courts have not developed justiciability doctrines with an eye 
towards protecting state sovereignty.297 Instead, their focus in fashioning 
 
291 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999). 
292 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
293 See id. 
294 See supra Part II.B. 
295 Cf. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (stating federalism is 
irrelevant to situations where the federal government is empowered to act). The one limitation on 
diversity jurisdiction based on federalism is the Eleventh Amendment, which courts have interpreted to 
prohibit federal courts generally from hearing suits by individuals against a state without its consent. 
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). 
296 Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of 
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1675 (1992). 
297 Particularly illuminating is Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). There, the Court 
considered whether a request for a judgment declaring a threatened prosecution for a state crime 
unconstitutional presented a justiciable controversy and, if so, whether a district court appropriately 
denied the declaratory judgment. If federalism underlay the justiciability doctrines, one would expect 
federalism to appear prominently in the justiciability analysis because the requested judgment would 
interfere with the state’s prosecutorial function. Yet the Court did not mention federalism in that portion 
of its analysis. Id. at 459–60. By contrast, the Court discussed federalism extensively in determining 
whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying declaratory relief. Id. at 460–
62.  
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those doctrines has been on defining which disputes the federal courts may 
resolve and which disputes should be left to the federal political 
branches.298 Consequently, those doctrines do not sort cases based on 
whether they involve national issues or local issues more appropriately 
handled by the states. Instead, they ask whether the dispute has 
characteristics that render it susceptible to judicial resolution.299 As long as 
a dispute has those characteristics, a federal court may hear the suit, even if 
it involves an important state issue such as the processes employed by state 
administrative agencies or the scope of state common laws.300 
Nor do the federal justiciability doctrines protect federalism by 
ensuring that federal courts do not unduly interfere with the state executive 
or legislative branches. Federal justiciability doctrines enforce the federal 
allocation of power among the courts, executive, and legislature. Many 
states have rejected the federal arrangement of power in favor of different 
allocations of power among their governmental departments. For instance, 
some states do not place all executive power in a single office but instead 
disperse it among several elected officials; some allow direct participation 
of their citizens through popular referenda; and some confer more power on 
their judges because those judges are subject to elections.301 These 
 
To be sure, in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 573–74 (1947), the 
Court arguably suggested in dicta that one consideration in determining whether a dispute is justiciable 
is whether the dispute comes “from state courts involving state legislation . . . [that] remain[s] 
unresolved or highly ambiguous.” But the Court’s opinion is ambiguous and can be equally read as 
saying that the clarity of state law is relevant only to determining whether a court should abstain from 
hearing a challenge to the constitutionality of state law, not whether there exists a case or controversy. 
This latter reading seems more sensible given that the existence of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution should not turn on the clarity of the law, and is more consistent with the Court’s subsequent 
abstention decisions.  
Highly respected treatises also do not discuss federalism as a basis for justiciability. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at § 2.1, 42–46; FALLON ET AL., supra note 36, at 80–153, 183–248; 13 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3529, at 611–39. The one notable exception is Professor Tribe’s 
treatise, which states that federalism informs justiciability doctrines, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.28, at 567–68 (3d ed. 2000), but the citation he provides does 
not support the claim, see id. § 3.28 at 568 (“Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional 
questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State’s law, for the 
federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet 
reviewed by the State’s highest court.” (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 
79 (1997))). The cited quotation discusses how abstention and certification promote federalism; it does 
not pertain to cases or controversies. 
298 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (justiciability “defin[es] the role assigned to the judiciary 
in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the President, and Congress). 
299 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
300 See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 168–71 (1997) (concluding that a 
challenge to conclusions of state administrative determination was justiciable); Cleveland Hous. 
Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 621 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding standing to 
challenge state nuisance laws). 
301 Hershkoff, supra note 53, at 1886–96 (giving examples of states with these characteristics). 
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differences and others affect how the states structure their justiciability 
doctrines.302 Applying federal justiciability in diversity cases therefore does 
not faithfully enforce the state’s scheme for directing who should decide a 
particular dispute. 
Instead of relying on justiciability to promote federalism,303 federal 
courts have developed discretionary doctrines to protect federalism.304 For 
example, under various abstention doctrines, federal courts may decline to 
hear claims if doing so will interfere with important state interests.305 
Likewise, courts have cited federalism in developing prudential 
jurisdictional rules, such as third-party standing.306 Federalism has also 
guided federal courts in deciding whether to award equitable relief307 and in 
fashioning the scope of those remedies.308 Federalism has also informed 
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes.309 But Article III commands none 
of these doctrines. Instead, they are prudential doctrines and doctrines of 
statutory interpretation. 
Federalism might provide a stronger case for imposing tighter federal 
limitations on justiciability in diversity cases if federal courts were not 
bound to follow state law as interpreted by the state courts, as was the case 
 
302 See id. 
303 Although justiciability doctrines do not seek to promote federalism, courts may use justiciability 
doctrines to protect state interests. See Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing that justiciability doctrines were not created with federalism in mind, but explaining that 
justiciability could nevertheless be used to further federalism). For example, courts may be quicker to 
dismiss for lack of justiciability a suit seeking particularly intrusive remedies against a state or its 
officers. See Fallon, supra note 211, at 650 (arguing that fear of entering intrusive remedies against a 
state may explain otherwise inconsistent standing rulings). But that argument does not establish that the 
justiciability doctrines are designed to protect federalism. Rather, it shows only that the federal courts 
may employ justiciability doctrines to protect federalism.  
304 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, §§ 11.1–14.4, at 763–919 (listing discretionary 
doctrines protecting federalism); Shapiro, supra note 262, at 580–85 (explaining how federalism 
informs discretionary doctrines whether to exercise jurisdiction). 
305 See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (abstaining to avoid interference with 
certain civil state cases); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (directing federal courts to abstain 
from issuing injunctions barring state criminal prosecutions); La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 
U.S. 25 (1959) (requiring abstention in cases that implicate an important “sovereign prerogative” and in 
which state law is unclear); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (directing federal courts to 
abstain to avoid interfering with administration of the state regulatory scheme). 
306 E.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing federalism as a reason to 
deny statutory standing). 
307 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (“[R]ecognition of the need for a 
proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions 
against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws . . . .”). 
308 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1977) (explaining federal courts should 
narrowly tailor injunctive relief against local government officers to avoid interfering with that 
government’s operations). 
309 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 
(2005) (invoking federalism to limit interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
109:57 (2015) Cases, Controversies, and Diversity 
103 
for suits involving “general” common law before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie.310 In that situation, federal courts would pose a greater 
threat to state sovereignty because they could control state law to some 
degree through their interpretations.311 But federal courts are bound to 
follow state law as interpreted by the state courts. They must follow state 
supreme court decisions on the content of all substantive state law,312 or do 
their best to ascertain how the state supreme court would rule when it has 
not passed on the issue.313 Because of these constraints, federal courts do 
not pose a threat warranting federal justiciability doctrines. 
Far from enforcing federalism, imposing federal justiciability 
requirements may undermine federalism. In those situations where a 
federal justiciability doctrine is more liberal than a state justiciability 
doctrine, a federal court’s decision to follow federal justiciability doctrine 
may result in the federal court ruling where the state would not permit it. 
For example, if a state chooses not to recognize any exceptions to the 
mootness doctrine, a federal court following federal doctrine might still 
hear a state law case that is otherwise moot under the capable of repetition 
yet evading review exception. Yet doing so would disturb the state 
allocation of powers by allowing a court to decide an issue that the state 
has determined is inappropriate for judicial resolution. Likewise, when a 
federal court refuses to hear a claim justiciable under state law, that court 
undermines state sovereignty by refusing to apply state law.314 Through that 
determination, the federal court impairs the ability of litigants to pursue 
their claims under state law even when they are entitled to do so.315 
 
310 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
311 Moreover, if they did not follow state interpretations, federal courts sitting in diversity would 
not function as alternative forums for the state courts, because they would be applying different 
substantive law than state courts. Federal courts would be applying federal interpretations of state law, 
while state courts would follow state interpretations of state law. Because federal courts would not be 
acting as state courts, there would be less reason to follow state justiciability doctrines.  
312 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (describing scope of Erie). This 
is not to say that Erie completely eliminated the federal court’s effect on state law. When a state 
supreme court has not decided an issue, the federal court must predict how the state court would decide 
the issue. That speculation may influence the development of state law. See Sloviter, supra note 296, at 
1676–79. But the states have the ultimate say on the content of their law, and they may reject the federal 
court’s determination. 
313 In some ways, Erie reduced the ability of the federal courts to combat state bias against out-of-
state litigants. States may exhibit bias against out-of-state litigants by developing doctrines that disfavor 
those litigants, and under Erie, federal courts must apply those biased state court doctrines. See Patrick 
J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World 
for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1993). 
314 Cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–35, 739–41 (2009) (holding that, because they must 
apply federal law, states usually cannot refuse to hear federal claims).  
315 Of course, litigants could file in state court instead of federal court, but that does not cure the 
federal judiciary’s interference with state sovereignty. 
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Following state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity cases would 
avoid these problems. 
B. Inconsistent Justiciability Doctrines 
One might object that applying state justiciability doctrines in 
diversity cases would lead to unwarranted inconsistencies in determining 
justiciability in federal court. There would no longer be a single set of 
justiciability doctrines in federal court. Instead, federal justiciability 
doctrines would apply to cases arising under federal law and other disputes 
raising federal interests, but state justiciability doctrines would control state 
law controversies brought under diversity jurisdiction. 
But a single justiciability doctrine need not apply to all types of 
dispute. As mentioned earlier, justiciability doctrines are not commanded 
by the text of Article III. Those doctrines largely originated as self-imposed 
limitations on the judicial power and were tied to Article III only later.316 
And even since being tied to Article III, the federal justiciability doctrines 
have continued to develop in a common-law-like process.317 Because 
justiciability is a judicially created concept, courts should develop 
justiciability doctrines in a way that reflects the reasons and concerns 
underlying particular grants of federal judicial power.318 
Applying a single justiciability test to all the various types of disputes 
in Article III does not accomplish this goal. Different values and concerns 
are at stake in each of the various categories of dispute in Article III. For 
example, the principal reasons for federal jurisdiction over cases arising 
under federal law are to promote uniform interpretation of federal law and 
to protect federal interests,319 but pursuing these goals presents a risk that 
the judiciary might interfere with the other branches of the federal 
government.320 By contrast, the primary reason for diversity jurisdiction is 
to prevent discrimination against certain litigants, and hearing those claims 
does not raise separation of powers concerns.321 These different 
considerations suggest that the same justiciability doctrines should not 
apply to these two divergent categories of dispute. Instead, justiciability 
doctrines should be tailored to allow federal courts to accomplish the goals 
underlying the respective jurisdictional grants to the extent they can 
without raising other concerns. 
 
316 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
317 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
318 Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1921) (explaining that 
the common law should evolve to reflect society’s changing sense of morality, justice, and fairness). 
319 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, § 5.2.1, at 284.  
320 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 473–74 (1982). 
321 See supra text accompanying notes 170 and 236–39. 
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Moreover, although this Article’s argument is not based on the text of 
Article III because that text does not provide the foundation for the content 
of the justiciability doctrines,322 the text does support the notion that federal 
courts may not play precisely the same role in each of the nine types of 
disputes delineated in Article III. In defining the scope of the judicial 
power, Article III does not describe the nine types of disputes identically. 
Instead, for six categories of disputes, including diversity jurisdiction, 
Article III empowers the federal courts to hear “controversies.”323 For the 
other three types of disputes, Article III empowers the federal courts to hear 
“cases.”324 Although there is disagreement on the significance of the 
different terms,325 Professor Pushaw has cogently argued that the difference 
in terminology may reflect a different scope of federal judicial power for 
those types of disputes.326 Article III itself thus may contemplate that the 
doctrines implementing “controversies” brought in diversity may differ 
from the doctrines implementing “cases.”327 
Of course, by the same logic, the repeated use of the term 
“controversy” may signify a decision to impose the same justiciability 
requirements to all those disputes referred to as “controversies.”328 
Although thoroughly assessing that argument is beyond the scope of this 
Article, on first glance that conclusion seems reasonable. Five of the six 
categories of “controversies” are forms of diversity jurisdiction. The same 
reason for extending federal jurisdiction—potential bias in state court—
underlies each grant, which suggests that the same justiciability rules 
should apply. 
The final category of “controversies” comprises disputes to which the 
United States is a party.329 Suits against the United States may raise 
separation of powers concerns, because they may result in federal judicial 
orders entered against the other branches of the federal government. But 
 
322 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
323 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.  
324 Id. 
325 See supra note 150.  
326 Pushaw, supra note 51, at 512–17. Professor Pushaw suggested from this difference that federal 
justiciability doctrines should apply to controversies but not cases. Id. at 519–20. But he did so only 
casually because resolving that question was not the focus of his paper; his goal was to show only that 
cases should be treated differently from controversies, not to determine the precise content of the 
justiciability doctrines to apply to those categories.  
327 Further support for differing scope of jurisdiction for the different grants of jurisdiction comes 
from an early draft of Article III that extended jurisdiction only to cases arising under federal law but to 
all “disputes” in which the parties were diverse. 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 146–47 (emphasis 
added).  
328 See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (noting a 
presumption that the same words in the same provision have the same meaning). 
329 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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there is still reason to align this grant of jurisdiction with state justiciability 
rules. The grant of jurisdiction covers claims against the United States that 
do not involve the Constitution or federal laws—if the claim involved those 
laws, the suit would be covered by the arising under provision of Article 
III. The reason for this grant of jurisdiction was that the state courts might 
seek to promote their local interests over those of the national 
government.330 Because the purpose of the grant of this jurisdiction was to 
allow any suits that could be brought in state court to be brought in federal 
court so as not to expose the United States to state bias, federal jurisdiction 
over claims against the United States should be at least as broad as state 
jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal justiciability doctrines should not apply to state law suits 
brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Instead, federal courts 
should apply state justiciability doctrines in those cases. Applying state 
justiciability doctrines would better achieve diversity jurisdiction’s goal of 
providing an alternative forum for resolving state claims involving out-of-
state litigants, and it would not conflict with the reasons underlying federal 
justiciability doctrines. 
Of course, moving away from federal justiciability doctrines—which 
tend to be more restrictive than state ones—to state justiciability could 
increase federal interference with state affairs. But all diversity cases 
involving state law present a threat to state sovereignty; whenever a federal 
court hears such a case, it injects itself into state affairs. The decision to 
include diversity jurisdiction in Article III reflects a determination that this 
infringement on state sovereignty was not so troublesome as to preclude 
federal intervention to prevent bias against out-of-state litigants. 
One might think that tinkering with justiciability in diversity cases is 
unnecessary because state courts do not exhibit the bias that motivated 
diversity jurisdiction.331 State courts today are not known for discriminating 
 
330 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton); see Pushaw supra note 
51, at 522 n. 353.  
331 The absence of bias has led to criticism of diversity as an unwarranted burden on the federal 
judiciary. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 523–27 (1928) (arguing for the curtailment of diversity jurisdiction). 
This criticism, however, has generally pressed for limits by statute, not by interpretation of Article III. 
Id. at 523 (“[T]he obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction should be promptly removed by 
legislation . . . .”). See generally MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
COURTS 219 (2d. ed. 2011) (“While judicial attitudes toward diversity jurisdiction may influence the 
way judges resolve a close case regarding its scope, most of the debate is directed at Congress . . . .”). 
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against out-of-state litigants.332 But that sense of the state courts may be 
wrong.333 The perception of fairness may be attributable to our inability to 
detect when local prejudice affects judgments. Or the lack of bias exhibited 
by state courts may be due in part to the existence of diversity jurisdiction; 
states might act more fairly to avoid losing cases to federal court. 
Moreover, that the states are fair today is no guarantee that they will be so 
tomorrow. That possibility counsels against reading the Constitution to 
restrict justiciability in diversity cases. If there is insufficient risk of bias to 
warrant federal jurisdiction, Congress has the power to limit federal 
jurisdiction. But the Constitution should not be read to preclude federal 
courts from hearing those claims in the event that Congress concludes that 
federal intervention is necessary. 
  
 
332 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 
(1990), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf [http://
perma.cc/GM85-8VBP] (concluding that bias against out-of-state litigants is not a significant problem). 
333 See, e.g., Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity 
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 384 (1992) (arguing that bias is perceived in 
more rural states).  
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